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Scholars have extensively studied the return of international mergers and acquisitions
(M&As). Yet, we know little about the risk or failure of international M&As. At the precompletion stage, around 20 percent of M&As get withdrawn, and risk, comparing to return,
is a better indicator of deal failure. My dissertation essay one investigates the interplay effects
of post-acquisition risk factors while my dissertation essay two examines the withdrawal of
international deals through the impact of traditional institutional development and
contemporary behavioral indicators at country level. Using asset pricing to measure shifts in
risk and a large sample of international acquisitions by US firms during 2000-2014, essay one
finds that acquirers can reduce their risk by trading internal and deal-level risk factors
(information asymmetry and moral hazard) off against external and country-level risk factors
(“liability of foreignness” and “double-layered acculturation”). Building on institutional
theory and information asymmetry argument, essay two applies the concept of operational
risk as the contingency of country governance quality and the likelihood of deal withdrawal.
Operational risk provides us a contemporary measure of organizational behavior under the
various “rules of the game”. Using panel data method and a sample of 8,008 cross-border
deals which includes 1,744 country pairs during 1996—2016, essay two finds that acquiring
country’s governance quality decreases the likelihood of deal withdrawal, and the risk
mitigating effect is even stronger when the selling country has a strong governance
mechanism as well, or when the acquiring country has high operational risk, or when the
selling country has lower operational risk.
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INTRODUCTION TO DISSERTATION ESSAYS

Motivation of the Dissertation Essays
The market of international mergers and acquisitions (M&As) has been particular
active in recent decades. Scholars from various fields such as finance, accounting,
management, and international business have studied the acquisition behavior of
multinational enterprises (MNEs) extensively (see review studies Haleblian et al., 2009;
Martynova & Renneboog, 2008; Shimizu et al., 2004; Tuch & O’Sullivan, 2007). However,
prior studies have heavily focused on the post-acquisition return (such as return on equity,
abnormal return, and integration capabilities etc.) rather than the post-acquisition risk or
failure even though the failure rate of international M&As ranges between 45% and 67%
(Mukherji, Dibrell, & Francis, 2013). To better understand the high failure rate, examining
the post-acquisition risk or failure directly is essential (Lee & Caves, 1998; Park & Russo,
1996).
Among the extant research on cross-border M&As, a few studies stand out for
probing the risk dimension of M&As (Chari & Chang, 2009; Reuer, Shenkar, & Ragozzino,
2004). Building their significant development in exploiting one source of risk as
performance-contingent payout (i.e., stock payment or earnouts) or share of equity sought,
Essay I addresses risk more holistically and allow the risk factors to complementarily
interplay with each other as recommended by integrated risk management perspective
(Miller, 1992).
The failure of M&As occurs either in the pre-completion stage or after the
completion. Studies have shown that around 20% of the M&A announcements end up being
withdrawn before completion (Bates & Lemmon, 2003). Deal withdrawal or deal
abandonment incurs a large amount of costs including upfront costs in target selection and
- 10 -

professional services (Bainbridge, 1990), costs of revealing private information (Officer,
2003), opportunity costs (Bainbridge, 1990), the cost of breaching the contract (e.g.,
termination fees) and reputational losses (He & Zhang, 2018). Despite of the substantial cost,
many firms still abandon their initiated deal, and we know little about the reasons behind the
phenomenon. Essay II examines the impact of a traditional country-level factor—institutional
environment, and one contemporary country-level factor—operational risk, on the likelihood
of international deal withdrawal.

Significance of Essay I
International M&A research concludes that the key risk factors are information asymmetry,
moral hazard, and country-level uncertainties such as the “liability of foreignness” and
“double-layered acculturation” (Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996; Eden & Miller, 2004). To
understand the behaviour of cross-border M&A risk and to assess the efficacy of mitigation
channels, we exploit the complementary and competing effects of these risk factors through
their indicators: industry relatedness, cultural distance, and institutional distance. Using a
sample of 1,874 international acquisitions by US firms from 2000 to 2014, we find our results
support our theoretical proposition: strategic international risk, examined in the context of
cross-border M&As in our study, is subject to an array of simultaneous trade-offs among the
risks of adverse selection, moral hazard, and target-country distance. Our study provides
three contributions.
First, Essay I bridges a gap in the international business (IB) literature on risk as the
performance outcome; while the literature is rich with theory and empirical evidence on the
outcomes of internationalization strategies, it is disproportionately focused on returns.
However, returns are just one facet of performance, which cannot illustrate the full outcomes
of internationalization. Along with the attainment of economic rents, managing risks is a
- 11 -

primary objective of firms operating internationally (Ghoshal, 1987; Miller, 1992). By
studying risk as the performance outcome, we open a debate to investigate, quantify, and
mitigate strategic international risks. Second, we contribute to the theory of integrated risk
management (Miller, 1992). The dominant theories explaining the cross-border M&A
phenomenon are transaction cost economics (TCE), ownership-location-internalization
(OLI), and the resource-based view (RBV). While these theories build a strong foundation
within this body of literature, Miller’s framework provides a unique perspective on theorizing
about cross-border M&A risk. Our study extends his integrated risk framework in the specific
context of cross-border M&As. We posit that acquirers can leverage internal factors from
deal-level characteristics to offset external risks coming from country-level factors. Third, we
contribute to the cross-border M&A literature by providing a measure of risk. Despite the
extensive research on cross-border M&As, we are not close to explaining the high failure
rates as we tend to overlook risk (Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison,
2009). Scholars have recently focused on examining abnormal returns as the performance
measure. Abnormal returns estimate the difference between actual and expected returns,
which assumes risk to be time-invariant across pre- and post-announcement periods. Thus,
they fail to account for possible shifts in the volatility – hence the risk – of stock returns.
Instead, we measure the acquirers’ post-acquisition shift in systematic risk from the
difference between pre- and post-announcement periods, using the Carhart Four-Factor
Model (Lubatkin & O’Neill, 1987).

Significance of Essay II
Information asymmetry is the main culprit of deal abandonment. A deal withdrawal usually
occurs because of the release of unexpected information after the announcement (Davidson
III, Rosentein, & Sundaram, 2002; Hotchkiss, Qian, & Song, 2005). The reasons for the
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revealing of new information could be (1) there is a misunderstanding of the information
shared; (2) unanticipated regulatory changes in the target’s country; (3) the acquirer made
mistakes or did not evaluate the target’s information as fully and precisely as the acquirer
should; (4) the target firm intentionally hid or fabricated its information before the
announcement in order to sell or sell at a high premium (Akerlof, 1970; Anagnostopoulou &
Tsekrekos, 2015; Reuer, 2005). While institutional theory provides us the environmental
explanations on reason one and two because organizations are “purposive entities designed
by their creators to maximize wealth, income, or other objectives defined by the opportunities
afforded by the institutional structure of the society” (North, 1990: 73), operational risk helps
us dive into the behavioral aspects of information asymmetry regarding the imperfect
information on what the target firm has done in the past (e.g., reason four).
Using a sample of 8,008 cross-border M&As which includes 1,744 country pairs
(target nation and acquirer nation) during 1996 to 2016, we find that the better the acquiring
(i.e., acquirer’s) country’s governance quality is, the lower the likelihood of the deal
abandonment. Furthermore, when the selling (i.e., target’s) country’s governance quality is
also high, the acquiring country’s governance quality decreases even more of the likelihood
of the deal abandonment. Additionally, the level of acquiring or selling country’s operational
risk has different moderating effect on the acquirer governance as well. When the acquirer is
from a country with strong governance mechanisms as well as high operational risk, the
acquirer is even less likely to abandon the deal with the foreign target. However, in
comparison, when the target is from a country with high operational risk, the acquiring
country’s governance quality would not have an as strong effect on mitigating the deal
closing risk.
One major contribution of Essay II is that we extend the scope and effect of
institutional theory in firm internationalization strategy by cooperating the role of another

- 13 -

contemporary country-level factor, operational risk. Institutional theory has provided us the
regulatory explanations through countries’ regulative, normative, and cognitive pillars in
international business activities (North 1990; Scott, 1995). Institutional distance, as the key
driver of “liability of foreignness” (Eden & Miller, 2004), offers rich and meaningful insights
on the performance and strategy making of firms’ internationalization. Although
organizations are assumed to modify “in the direction of increasing compatibility with
environmental characteristics” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p.149), employees are subjective
and “act on their own perceptions and act in unpredictable as well as predictable ways”
(Astley & Van De Ven, 1983). By applying the concept of operational risk, we combine the
“rules of the game” and organizational actions, enriching the institutional theory with a
behavioral aspect or a measured outcome of enforcement. Operational risk is a contemporary
measure of organizational behavior with country-level variations, which further helps the
institutional theory to identify the co-evolutionary and dynamic effect between MNEs
activities and governance development.

- 14 -

ESSAY I:
MITIGATING POST-ACQUISITION RISK:
THE INTERPLAY OF CROSS-BORDER UNCERTAINTIES

ABSTRACT
Do international acquisitions increase acquirers’ risk? If so, can cross-border uncertainties
interact and offset such risk? The perspective of integrated risk management suggests
international acquirers could mitigate their overall risk through the interplay of various levels
of uncertainties. Using asset pricing to measure shifts in risk and a large sample of
international acquisitions by US firms during 2000-2014, we find that acquirers can reduce
their risk by trading internal and deal-level risk factors (information asymmetry and moral
hazard) off against external and country-level risk factors (“liability of foreignness” and
“double-layered acculturation”).

Keywords: risk; mergers and acquisitions; international; cultural distance; institutional
distance
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INTRODUCTION
Despite the substantial uncertainty surrounding the global marketplace, the market of
international mergers and acquisitions (M&As) has been particularly active. Due to the
exciting and often contentious nature of M&A activities, scholars from various disciplines
have studied the acquisition behaviour of multinational enterprises (MNEs) extensively. Even
with the wealth of research, international M&As have been reported to present very high
failure rates, often ranging between 45% and 67% (Mukherji, Dibrell, & Francis, 2013).
While risk is a well-defined predictor of failure, most studies place a disproportionate focus
on the return side of performance (Lee & Caves, 1998; Park & Russo, 1996). To better
understand the high failure rate of M&As, the examination of M&A risk is essential. Thus, in
this article, we investigate whether cross-border M&As involve increased risk for the
acquirer and if so what international acquirers should do to offset the increased risk.
The theoretical foundation of our paper lies in Miller’s (1992) perspective of
integrated risk management, suggesting international acquirers should utilize simultaneous
trade-offs among various levels of uncertainties for strategic international risk management.
In other words, the various uncertainties encountered by an MNE can interplay and reduce
the firm’s overall risk. Building on Miller’s (1992) work, a small number of scholars find that
MNEs can actually utilize integrated risk management to reduce risk across varied contexts.
Shrader, Oviatt, and McDougall (2000) show how new ventures can manage their risk by
trading three factors off against each other: foreign location, entry mode, and the proportion
of revenue exposed to certain locations. Das and Teng (1998) recommend understanding the
behaviour of strategic alliances by integrating resource and risk dimensions. In supply chain
risk management, it is crucial to acknowledge the interacting effects of supply risks, demand
risks, and operational risks (Manuj & Mentzer, 2008). In line with this important body of
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literature, our study employs the integrated risk management perspective in the context of
cross-border M&As.
Among the extant research on cross-border M&As, the studies of Chari and Chang
(2009) and Reuer, Shenkar, and Ragozzino (2004) stand out for probing the risk dimension of
M&As. Building on their significant developments, our study offers two extensions: First,
while these studies focus on a single source of risk, we address risk more holistically.
Specifically, Reuer et al. (2004) examine risk mitigation by performance-contingent payout
(i.e., stock payment or earnouts). Since contingent payout is a payment method that depends
on the success of the deal and the performance of the target, it addresses the information
asymmetry problem and transfers the acquirer’s downside risk to the target. Nonetheless,
information asymmetry, leading to the risk of adverse selection, is only one source of risk in
cross-border M&As. Chari and Chang (2009), on the other hand, explore the determinants of
share of equity. While share of equity does have implications for resource commitment, risk,
returns, and control, it is not an explicit measure of risk. Expanding on these two studies, we
address the risk of cross-border M&As via a more direct and precise approach. Second, the
above studies directly examine the determinants or risk factors, which shows that they
assume the factors are competing rather than complementary in nature. In contrast, we
emphasize the complementary interplay effect among the sources of risk, and allow the risk
factors to interact with each other.
International M&A research concludes that the key risk factors are information
asymmetry, moral hazard, and country-level uncertainties such as the “liability of
foreignness” and “double-layered acculturation” (Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996; Eden &
Miller, 2004). The “liability of foreignness” stresses the social cost of doing business abroad,
which results from the unfamiliarity that foreign firms face (Eden & Miller, 2004). A foreign
firm engaged in M&As also deals with the issue of double-layered acculturation, which refers
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to the cultural distances at both the country and corporate level (Barkema et al., 1996). To
understand the behaviour of cross-border M&A risk and to assess the efficacy of mitigation
channels, we exploit the complementary and competing effects of these risk factors through
their indicators: industry relatedness, cultural distance, and institutional distance. Industry
relatedness indicates the organizational similarity in terms of business traits and goals, which
implies the degree of information asymmetry and moral hazard problems. Institutional
distance is the key driver behind the “liability of foreignness” (Eden & Miller, 2004). Finally,
cultural distance at the country level measures the outer layer of “double-layered
acculturation”.
Using a sample of 1,874 international acquisitions by US firms from 2000 to 2014, we
find significant moderating effects among industry relatedness, cultural distance, and
institutional distance on acquirers’ post-acquisition risk. For instance, while industry
relatedness on its own increases post-acquisition systematic risk, the presence of cultural
distance can (at least partially) offset such risk effects. In other words, if a firm acquires a
related target in a culturally distant country, post-takeover risk decreases. If, on the other
hand, the target is in a culturally similar country, the acquirer experiences an even more
pronounced increase in risk. Therefore, “double-layered acculturation” can act as a risk
mitigation scenario for cross-border acquirers. Futhermore, the increased risk from industry
relatedness can also be mitigated by institutional distance, especially when the related targets
are from upstream institutions (i.e., countries with better institutional development than the
US). Lastly, we find that acquirers’ risk declines when the targets are from upstream
countries with both culturally and institutionally distant environments. Our results therefore
support our theoretical proposition: strategic international risk, examined in the context of
cross-border M&As in our study, is subject to an array of simultaneous trade-offs among the
risks of adverse selection, moral hazard, and target-country distance.
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Our study provides three contributions. First, we bridge a gap in the international
business (IB) literature on risk as the performance outcome; while the literature is rich with
theory and empirical evidence on the outcomes of internationalization strategies, it is
disproportionately focused on returns. However, returns are just one facet of performance,
which cannot illustrate the full outcomes of internationalization. Along with the attainment of
economic rents, managing risks is a primary objective of firms operating internationally
(Ghoshal, 1987; Miller, 1992). By studying risk as the performance outcome, we open a
debate to investigate, quantify, and mitigate strategic international risks. Second, we
contribute to the theory of integrated risk management (Miller, 1992). The dominant theories
explaining the cross-border M&A phenomenon are transaction cost economics (TCE),
ownership-location-internalization (OLI), and the resource-based view (RBV). While these
theories build a strong foundation within this body of literature, Miller’s framework provides
a unique perspective on theorizing about cross-border M&A risk. Our study extends his
integrated risk framework in the specific context of cross-border M&As. We posit that
acquirers can leverage internal factors from deal-level characteristics to offset external risks
coming from country-level factors. Third, we contribute to the cross-border M&A literature
by providing a measure of risk. Despite the extensive research on cross-border M&As, we are
not close to explaining the high failure rates as we tend to overlook risk (Haleblian, Devers,
McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison, 2009). Scholars have recently focused on examining
abnormal returns as the performance measure. Abnormal returns estimate the difference
between actual and expected returns, which assumes risk to be time-invariant across pre- and
post-announcement periods. Thus, they fail to account for possible shifts in the volatility –
hence the risk – of stock returns. Instead, we measure the acquirers’ post-acquisition shift in
systematic risk from the difference between pre- and post-announcement periods, using the
Carhart Four-Factor Model (Lubatkin & O’Neill, 1987).
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we discuss the
theoretical framework and put forward testable hypotheses. Then, we present our empirical
data and methodology. The fourth section illustrates the results and the fifth provides
robustness checks for our study. The last section concludes.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
As one of the primary objectives of MNEs, risk management is a critical area in need of
contemporary theorization and quantitative mitigation (Ghoshal, 1987; Lee & Caves, 1998).
In the past, scholars and risk managers have treated risk purely in terms of one particular type
of uncertainty, excluding other existing ones. With the development of globalization and
technology, the risk manager is increasingly becoming involved in managing a broader
spectrum of risks facing the firm (Colquitt, Hoyt, & Lee, 1999). In the context of IB, MNEs
face various and numerous levels of uncertainties, ranging from the firm level to the general
environmental level, which makes IB inherently risky. The complexity of uncertainties for
MNEs drove the development of integrated risk management especially for IB (Miller, 1992,
1998). Specifically, Miller (1992) proposed a framework with multiple dimensions of risks
for international businesses. These multiple dimensions of risks are suggested to be
simultaneously determined, or interrelated, rather than operating independently of each other.
Truly, MNEs’ financial (or foreign exchange) risk is highly related to their strategic risk. The
failure to hedge a firm’s exposure to foreign exchange risk would risk the success or
performance of a firm’s strategies.
Miller’s (1992) perspective of interdependencies between risk factors formulates his
insight: managing those risks often involves trade-offs. A trade-off between exposures to
various uncertainties means that a reduction of one uncertainty may result in increased
exposure to another uncertainty (Miller, 1992). Thus, MNEs can manage multiple IB risks by
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trading one risk off against another to keep the overall risk lower than it would be without
such trade-offs (Shrader et al., 2000). As mentioned before, IB scholars have theoretically
developed and empirically tested the theory of integrated risk management in the context of
new ventures, supply chain risk management, and strategic alliances. This paper further
employs the theory in the context of international M&As, considering the various levels of
risk factors acquirers face.
Information asymmetry between the acquirer and the target is the primary risk factor
in M&As, existing when the bidder lacks precise or sufficient information about the target
(Chari & Chang, 2009; Reuer et al., 2004). When asymmetrical information prevails between
two companies, the acquirer faces the risk of adverse selection (i.e., overpayment) due to an
inaccurate evaluation of the target’s value or excessive transaction costs during the
negotiation phase. As Mukherji et al. (2013) point out, information asymmetry is a major
source of overbidding risk, particularly due to the misevaluation of intangible assets. In
addition to adverse selection as the ex-ante valuation uncertainty (i.e., risk prior to deal
completion), moral hazard problems (Alchian & Woodward, 1988; Holmstrom, 1982) are
also likely to occur both before and after deal completion. On the one hand, to the extent that
CEOs influence board decisions on compensation, as supported by the “managerial power”
view, acquisitions can be used by CEOs as justification for additional compensation
(Grinstein & Hribar, 2004). Since compensation contracts are often not designed perfectly,
managers may also be allowed to extract rents that are linked to the completion or size of a
deal, rather than its performance 1. On the other hand, following deal completion, information
asymmetry between the owner and the manager – as well as that between the managers of the
bidder and the target – may continue to exist. The acquirer is therefore exposed to further

1

Grinstein and Hribar (2004) report that, in 4 out of 10 deals in their sample, deal completion was cited as a criterion for the
provision bonuses, averaging over $1.4 million on top of any other compensation.
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uncertainty and moral hazard problems, factors often cited as potential causes of integration
failure (Chi, 1994).
The risk of adverse selection and moral hazard problems are common factors in
M&As, and are internal or endogenous uncertainties for acquirers. Following Gatignon and
Anderson (1988), we consider risk factors that are limited to within organizations (i.e., the
acquirer and the target) as internal uncertainty. These internal risk factors are exacerbated
when it comes to cross-border M&As (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988). In an international
context, internal risk factors (adverse selection and moral hazard problems) are amplified by
external influences such as the “liability of foreignness” and “double-layered acculturation”
(Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Barkema et al., 1996; Eden & Miller, 2004). Being exposed to
“double-layered acculturation”, acquirers not only encounter the target’s different
organizational culture but also often compete with its different national culture. These
external risks result from differences in national culture, institutional environments, business
practices, and customer behaviors, which heighten information asymmetry and complexity.
Studies in international economics and finance have approached the issue from the
theoretical and empirical lens of “familiarity” or cultural affinity (Guiso, Sapienza, &
Zingales, 2009). In general, investors appear reluctant to hold the securities of firms they are
not familiar with, a principle which also explains “home bias” in investment portfolios,
overseas listing decisions etc. As Chan, Covrig, and Ng (2005) also reveal, investors may
even present foreign bias, by overweighting their portfolios towards certain foreign markets,
depending on the level of economic development, market capitalization, transaction costs, or
any factors reducing information asymmetry. The same norm has been found to apply in
overseas-listing decisions, with companies showing preferences for foreign markets with
geographical proximity or other familiar characteristics, explaining the propensity of US
issuers to cross-list in Canada, the United Kingdom, and certain European countries. In the
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domain of cross-border M&As – where cross-cultural interactions between acquirers and
targets are expected to be more intense – Siegel, Licht, and Schwartz (2011) document that
the distance between origin and destination countries regarding critical informal institutions,
such as cultural egalitarianism, not only explains the home bias in portfolio holdings and
acquisition volume, but also the value destruction in cross-border M&As. Furthermore,
Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi’s (2015) recent work gives further empirical support to the
view that distance in cultural values negatively influences merger activity and acquirer
returns. The above theoretical and empirical lens from international finance corroborates the
IB paradigm that MNEs in general, and international acquirers in particular, face unfavorable
odds when engaging in cross-border strategic investments.
However, in cross-border acquisitions, internal risk factors (adverse selection and
moral hazard problems) and external uncertainties (“liability of foreignness” and “doublelayered acculturation”) are complementary and overlapping (Chari & Chang, 2009; Reuer &
Koza, 2000). Moreover, these internal (firm-level) and external (country-level) uncertainties
are interrelated and can thus be traded off against alternative firm strategies (Miller, 1992). In
other words, according to Miller’s (1992) integrated risk management perspective, when a
firm’s exposure to one level of uncertainty increases, its exposure to another level of
uncertainty decreases, and the firm can manage its risk by adjusting its strategy through
simultaneous trade-offs among the levels of uncertainties. To be more specific to our context,
international acquirers can mitigate their risk by simultaneously trading the external
uncertainties (“liability of foreignness” and “double-layered acculturation”) off against
internal uncertainties (adverse selection and moral hazard problems). From earlier studies,
acquirers could passively mitigate their risk by controlling the equity sought or the payment
method. In our study, we integrate the internal with the external risk factors, allowing the
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acquirers to mitigate their risk in an active fashion. We utilize such indicators of uncertainties
as industry relatedness, institutional distance, and cultural distance.

HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Industry Relatedness
Synergy theory argues that related acquisitions – where acquirers and targets share strategic
interdependence, redeploy resources, and combine at an operating level – will produce
benefits (Capron, Dussauge, & Mitchell, 1998). In related acquisitions, it is easier for the
acquirer to evaluate the target’s business and value because of the similarities, reducing the
degree of information asymmetry and subsequent moral hazard problems. Thus, the acquirer
is – at least in theory – subject to a lower risk of adverse selection (Chari & Chang, 2009;
Reuer et al., 2004). However, many acquisitions that are potentially synergistic fail to create
value or even ultimately lead to divestitures (Bergh, 1997; Davidson III, Rosenstein, &
Sundaram, 2002). In order to benefit from operational synergies, related acquisitions require
the bidders to invest heavily in implementation (or integration) after the deal. These
implementation costs are higher in a cross-border context, due to the distance between the
acquirer and the target in terms of culture, geography, and institutions (Chakrabarti &
Mitchell, 2016). In the meantime, the high implementation costs have a larger impact in an
international context for related acquisitions than unrelated ones (Chakrabarti & Mitchell,
2016).
Furthermore, the acquisition of related targets tends to drive acquirers’ confidence and
hubris up because the acquirer feels they know enough about the target’s business (Lubatkin
& O’Neill, 1987). Assuming there is sufficient and symmetric information about the target’s
business, an acquirer is more likely to underestimate the implementation costs and
consolidation efforts. Integration costs often exceed the expected value of the synergies, thus
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contributing to value destruction and the risk of integration failure. By underestimating costs
and under-resourcing consolidation efforts, acquirers are prone to neglect important
administrative functions (Kitching, 1967). Therefore, the more related a target is, the higher
the risk of administrative business and integration failure is.
Singh and Montgomery (1987) argue that related acquisitions provide the acquirer
with greater economies of scale and scope, while unrelated ones are likely to achieve
financial and administrative synergies. Thus, unrelated cross-border acquisitions have more
potential to lower the acquirer’s cost of capital (Chatterjee, 1986). As a lower cost of capital
reduces the required rate of return on investment, it allows for further investment
opportunities, thus bringing higher value and lower systematic risk for the firm, all other
things being equal (Lubatkin & O’Neill, 1987). In addition, unrelated overseas acquisitions
are known to be more “satisfactory vehicles” for risk reduction than domestic ones, because
of the diversification into international markets (Hisey & Caves, 1985; Seth, Song, & Pettit,
2002). We therefore expect that related cross-border M&As will be accompanied by higher
risk than unrelated ones ceteris paribus.

H1: Industry relatedness between the acquirer and the target increases the acquirer’s
risk in cross-border M&As.

Cultural Distance
The research on the impact of cultural distance on M&A outcomes has been inconclusive and
contradictory (Björkman, Stahl, & Vaara, 2007; Chakrabarti, Gupta-Mukherjee, &
Jayaraman, 2009). On the one hand, cultural distance at the country level may provide
strengths and advantages to the acquirer, assuming they have pre-deal awareness of the
cultural difference and are well-prepared for the challenges it will pose (Chakrabarti et al.,
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2009). On the other hand, cultural distance is found to impede the integration and capability
transfer because of so-called “double-layered acculturation” (Barkema et al., 1996), with one
layer arising from difficulties at the organizational culture level and the other at the national
culture level. Acquirer and target have to combine both levels of cultural differences. In
addition, as Siegel et al. (2011) suggest, as cultural distance increases, target-firm
stakeholders may become more difficult to deal with, subsidiary management becomes harder
to monitor, and negotiations become more complex and costlier, ultimately giving rise to a
risk of the deal being abandoned altogether. We therefore argue that “double-layered
acculturation” can actually increase acquirer risk in cross-border M&As. The outer layer of
country-level differences amplifies the risk generated by the inner layer of organization-level
differences. Thus, we expect that cultural distance between the acquirer and the target at the
country level will increase the acquirer’s risk in international M&As.

H2: Cultural distance between the acquirer’s country and the target’s country
increases the acquirer’s risk in cross-border M&As.

Institutional Distance
Country governance is defined as the tradition and institutions by which authority is
exercised (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011). The difference in country governance (i.e.,
institutional distance) between the acquirer and the target is the key driver behind the
“liability of foreignness” (Eden & Miller, 2004). Thus, institutional distance is a critical
factor for cross-border M&A performance. Scholars have examined its influences on the
acquirer’s abnormal returns (Chari, Ouimet, & Tesar, 2009; Ellis, Moeller, Schlingemann, &
Stulz, 2017; Gubbi, Aulakh, Ray, Sarkar, & Chittoor, 2010), deal completion or abandonment
(Dikova, Sahib, & Van Witteloostuijn, 2010; Zhou, Xie, & Wang, 2016), and target
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premiums (Bris & Cabolis, 2008; Weitzel & Berns, 2006). Kwok and Reeb (2000), propose
an upstream-downstream hypothesis, which states that MNEs going upstream (i.e.,
internationalizing into a more institutionally developed economy) experience a risk reduction,
but those going downstream (i.e., internationalizing into a less institutionally developed
economy) experience a risk increase. Upstream institutions provide more economic and
political stability, which decreases the acquirer’s currency and governance risk. Also, in an
upstream environment, assets and investments are easier for the acquirer to expropriate and
exploit, which decreases its financial risk.
More recent work supports country governance being portable in M&As (Bris,
Brisley, & Cabolis, 2008; Chari et al., 2009; Ellis, Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2017),
such that MNEs acquiring downstream targets can transfer their relatively better governance,
thus facilitating resource redeployment, exploration, and diversification of their strategic
assets. By sharing and transferring, the acquirer can improve the target’s value by controlling
its corporate governance practices in its accounting, legal regulations, operational process etc.
Therefore, acquiring downstream targets may ultimately decrease acquirers’ risk.
Drawing from Kwok and Reeb (2000) above, but also acknowledging the portability
of country governance, we therefore posit that:

H3: Institutional distance between the acquirer’s country and a downstream target’s
country decreases the acquirer’s risk in cross-border M&As.
H4: Institutional distance between the acquirer’s country and an upstream target’s
country decreases the acquirer’s risk in cross-border M&As.
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Industry Relatedness and Cultural Distance
With increasing M&A activities, international acquirers have prior awareness of the cultural
distance of a target’s nation and its potential influences on negotiation and integration
(Chakrabarti et al., 2009). The awareness of information asymmetry due to cultural distance
outstrips neglect or overconfidence coming from industry relatedness. Acquirers will likely
engage more thoroughly with ex-ante M&A procedures such as screening, selection,
evaluation, due diligence, and contracting. In other words, when acquiring a culturally distant
target, the bidder will assume similarly high levels of information asymmetry for related as
for unrelated targets. In the same vein, during the ex-post integration phase, acquirers –
conscious of the cultural differences – will be better prepared for potential obstacles. This
preparation will make the acquirers less likely to underestimate the implementation costs and
potential hurdles in integrations with related targets when the firms are culturally disparate
(Chakrabarti et al., 2009). Therefore, while acquirers may underestimate integration and
consolidation costs in related acquisitions (Lubatkin & O’Neill, 1987), the presence of high
cultural distance will incite more rigorous ex-ante and ex-post M&A procedures, which will
offset any overlooked aspects due to industry relatedness. Therefore, we propose that cultural
distance will facilitate the operational synergy stemming from industry relatedness, and thus
the interaction between cultural distance and industry relatedness will reduce the acquirer’s
risk in cross-border M&As. In other words:

H5: The higher the cultural distance between the acquirer’s and the target’s nations,
the lower is the effect of industry relatedness on the acquirer’s shift in risk.
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Industry Relatedness and Institutional Distance
In the context of cross-border M&As, as we argued above, the risks of moral hazard and
information asymmetry are heightened, especially when the acquisition target is in a related
industry. However, high institutional distance may allow the acquirer to experience a risk
reduction either by allowing more autonomy to the target, or simply by taking advantage of
the reduced sensitivity to market shocks.
The more related a target is to the bidder, the more likely corporate managers are to
reinforce consolidation efforts, rather than execute autonomous management within the
subsidiary (Lubatkin & O’Neill, 1987). This can increase integration efforts and lead to
losses associated with deal implementation risk (i.e. employee turnover, litigation, etc.). In
fact, Salomon and Wu (2012, p. 344) suggest that “Foreign firms from more institutionally
distant home countries are more likely to adopt local isomorphism strategies to acquire
legitimacy and mitigate the liability of foreignness.” As such – particularly for related deals –
in cases of high institutional distance acquirers are more likely to allow organizational
autonomy to the target in order to better adopt the host country’s institutions and norms. This
will in turn not only better help acquirers to reduce risks associated with legitimacy costs, but
also ultimately facilitate integration and mitigate the implementation uncertainties described
above. In other words, while for domestic deals quick and effective integration can shield
acquirers from risks associated with diseconomies of scale, in the presence of institutional
distance bidders will not rush to impose an integration mandate unless it is reasonably safe
and prudent to do so.
In addition, despite the stylized fact in international finance that countries exhibit high
stock market integration or interdependence (Forbes & Rigobon, 2002; Lee, 2006),
institutional distance has been found to reduce market co-movement. Specifically, across
global markets, the development of similar principal institutions (e.g., political and legal

- 29 -

systems) increases the co-movement of stock returns, while institutional distance decreases it
(Tavares, 2009). Therefore, it can be argued that institutional distance, by reducing market
interdependence between the acquirer and target countries, can also act as a “cushion” to
industry-specific shocks (i.e. from regulatory shifts, supply and labor shortages, etc), thereby
mitigating the acquirer’s sensitivity to home-host market uncertainties.
Therefore, institutional distance can act as a risk mitigation device for related
acquisitions from both downstream and upstream countries; however, since the magnitude of
the effects for the downstream and upstream countries may differ, we make two distinct
hypotheses:

H6: The higher the institutional distance between the acquirer’s country and a
downstream target’s country, the lower is the effect of industry relatedness on the
acquirer’s shift in risk.
H7: The higher the institutional distance between the acquirer’s country and an
upstream target’s country, the lower is the effect of industry relatedness on the
acquirer’s shift in risk.

Cultural Distance and Institutional Distance
Culture is embedded in organizational structures and management styles (Schneider, 1990).
Thus, with awareness of potential integration problems, the acquirer is expected to possess a
diverse set of routines and repertoires as a result of acquiring culturally distant targets
(Morosini, Shane, & Singh, 1998). Such diversity increases the acquirer’s innovation and
thus competitiveness in the long run. Nevertheless, since cultural values guide managers’
decision-making towards risk and return (Li, Griffin, Yue, & Zhao, 2013; March & Shapira,
1987), diversity in managerial risk-taking and opportunity recognition might also be affected.
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What may be perceived as risk by managers in the acquirer’s country might be treated as
opportunity in the target’s.
With culturally different targets, acquirers are hence able to diversify their portfolio of
managerial risk-taking. After all, subsidiaries and headquarters enjoy different standards and
levels of risk and opportunity assessment, which drives diverse investment opportunities and
uncorrelated operating earnings. Thus, by acquiring culturally distant targets, acquirers will
build stronger internal resilience against market uncertainty. In addition, like institutional
distance, cultural distance has been reported to result in lower levels of market co-movement
(Lucey & Zhang, 2010). Thus, with both institutional distance and cultural distance, acquirers
can not only strengthen their internal resilience, but also reduce their sensitivity to marketlevel shocks, ultimately reducing their combined systematic risk.
Following Kwok and Reeb (2000), acquirers of upstream targets (where the acquirer’s
institutional environment is less developed than the target’s) have a better ability to arbitrage
markets and leverage their capabilities towards reducing risk. On the other hand, acquirers of
downstream targets (acquirer’s institutional environment is more developed than the target’s)
enjoy the portability of corporate governance and improve their targets’ capabilities at
resource exploitation, which also decreases their exposure to regulatory and environmental
uncertainties. We therefore posit that, in the presence of high institutional distance (from
either downstream or upstream markets), acquiring a culturally distant target will mitigate the
acquirer’s risk; however, as in H3 and H4 above, we appreciate that the effects of
downstream and upstream distance may differ in magnitude, so we put forward two distinct
hypotheses:
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H8: The higher the institutional distance between the acquirer’s country and a
downstream target’s country, the lower is the effect of cultural distance on the
acquirer’s shift in risk.
H9: The higher the institutional distance between the acquirer’s country and an
upstream target’s country, the lower is the effect of cultural distance on the acquirer’s
shift in risk.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The Sample of Cross-border M&As
We collected data on US acquirers and foreign targets in completed deals from Thomson
EIKON Deals (formerly Thomson One - SDC), combining it with archival accounting data
from Compustat and share price data from CRSP. To include a merger in our sample, we
employed a number of criteria in line with the majority of the relevant empirical studies. Our
original sample included all completed deals during the period 2000-2014, where the acquirer
was a US firm listed on one of the three main US exchanges (i.e. New York Stock Exchange;
NASDAQ; AMEX) and the target was a non-US firm, either public or private. The size of the
deal had to exceed $1 million with a minimum of a 5% stake sought by the acquirer during
the deal. To ensure that the voting and cash flow rights in the target company were
transferred to the shareholders of the acquirer, acquisitions of associates and minority stakes
were also excluded from the analysis, and the acquirer’s stake in the target company after
deal completion had to exceed 50%. Broadly, these baseline parameters ensured that only
significant and representative takeover deals would be included in the sample, while the
exchange of small (minority) stakes and any similar over-the-counter transactions would be
excluded. In addition to the above, sufficient, reliable, and accurate data for a number of
essential accounting variables had to be available from Compustat and CRSP. These
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screening criteria and this procedure resulted in a sample of 1,893 cross-border deals for
which we were able to collect data on all of the necessary variables.

Dependent Variable and Model Specification
With respect to measuring cross-border M&A risk, Lee and Caves (1998) suggest three
alternatives: the variance of profits, the variance of abnormal stock market returns, and the
turnover of a foreign subsidiary through shutdown and divestiture. Based on detailed
comparisons and high correlations among these three measures (Lee & Caves, 1998), we
measure M&A risk by stock market volatility using Carhart’s Four-Factor Model (1997).
In modern portfolio theory, risk comprises two main components, namely systematic
risk, broadly defined as a firm’s returns sensitivity to market returns, and unsystematic (or
idiosyncratic) risk, which is the uncertainty specific to particular assets or firms. While
unsystematic risk is inherent to a specific firm or industry, due to various unexpected factors
– such as a new market entrant, regulatory shifts, shortages in labor, parts, etc. – systematic
risk arises from market-wide shocks – such as changes in GDP, inflation, interest rates,
government policies, or even acts of nature – which introduce uncertainty across all market
participants. In asset pricing, investors – and by extension firms – can diversify away the
unsystematic component of risk (i.e. firm-specific risk) by holding a broad range of asset
classes, which cancel each other out. However, since the exposure of a portfolio to the entire
market cannot be mitigated through diversification, systematic risk remains the component
with the most relevance for firms and investors. As cross-border acquisitions can utilize
differences across international markets, they are devices firms may be able to use to lower
their systematic risk. Therefore, systematic risk is a particularly relevant measure of risk for
our analysis.
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While standard event study methodologies normally estimate the information content
of M&A announcements and other news, by means of abnormal returns, using some variant
of the market model benchmark, we take a different approach. Unlike ordinary events that
mainly influence cash flows – and whose information content can be estimated by a standard
event study – a merger causes changes in both the risk and returns of individual securities. As
a matter of fact, Brown, Harlow, & Tinic (1988) showed that many events cause the variance
of returns to shift due to a temporary (or permanent) shift in systematic risk, so that the use of
common methods may fail (Boehmer, Masumeci, & Poulsen, 1991). If the news about the
merger impacts on a firm’s systematic risk, on top of any future cash flows, benchmark
parameters (factor loadings) estimated unconditionally during the estimation period (pre
M&A announcement) will be biased and unable to be employed in the event window (post
M&A announcement), since the betas may have shifted. Most event studies use preannouncement benchmark parameters to estimate post-announcement returns, while our aim
is to actually model possible shifts in risk. Therefore, following MacKinlay (1997), to address
whether an event impacts on risk we need to formulate the market model to allow betas to
change over the event.
In modeling the share price returns of cross-border acquirers, we opt for the Carhart
Four-Factor Model. While the majority of the literature has examined similar events using
residuals from single-factor asset pricing models, such as the market model or the Capital
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), multifactor models have been reported to explain more
variation in the cross-section of average stock returns (over 95% compared to 70% on
average by the CAPM). Fama and French (1993), particularly, point out that residuals from
three-factor regressions will do a better job in isolating the firm-specific components of
returns in event studies of the stock-price response to firm-specific information. A multifactor
model is therefore more apt for the purposes of our study.
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Using daily share price returns data from CRSP, we first calculate Total Risk as the
total variability in a security’s returns (Lubatkin & O’Neill, 1987), measured as the standard
deviation of a firm’s returns after accounting for the risk-free rate, σ

. Thus, we

calculate the standard deviation of the daily returns for each acquirer six months (120 trading
days) before and six months after a cross-border M&A announcement as
follows:

.

To estimate the acquirer’s systematic risk before and after each announcement we use
the Carhart Four-Factor Model:
(1)
where

is the excess return of firm i minus the one-month T-bill (risk-free) return at

time t. In the Carhart Four-Factor Model,

is the risk-adjusted abnormal return of firm i;

is the difference between the daily NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ value-weighted
market portfolio returns and the risk-free return; high minus low (HML) is the difference
between the returns on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and a portfolio of low bookto-market stocks; small minus big (SMB) is the difference between the returns on a portfolio
of small stocks and a portfolio of large stocks and is a proxy for small-firm risk; up minus
down (UMD) is the return on a zero-cost portfolio that is long previous return winners and
short previous loser stocks, which controls for momentum, the empirically observed tendency
for rising asset prices to rise further and falling prices to keep falling. Therefore, the four risk
parameter coefficients (factor loadings)

jointly represent the systematic risk of the firm.

Having estimated risk parameters for every firm in our sample during both periods,
before and after the merger announcement, we proceed to calculate Systematic Risk
for each period, by adjusting Total Risk

using the coefficient of

determination (R2) of eq. 1 above as follows:
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(2)
Finally, we calculate the annualized systematic risk for the two periods as
(3)
and our dependent variable (∆Risk) is the difference in the annualized systematic risk of the
acquirer’s stock returns during the 120 trading days after the acquisition announcement and
that during the 120 trading days prior to the announcement:
(4)
A positive value of ∆Risk indicates an increase in the systematic risk for the acquirer and a
negative one suggests a decrease in the risk. To explain the variation in the post-acquisition
changes in the acquirers’ risk and directly test our study hypotheses, we employ the following
general equation:
(5)
where

is Industry Relatedness for each deal (i) in the sample,

between the acquirer’s (US) and the target’s nation,

and

Distance for downstream and upstream deals respectively,
variables known to influence systematic risk, and

is the Cultural Distance
is the Institutional

denotes a set of control

is a set of year fixed effects.

Independent Variables
We measure Industry Relatedness (IR) as a dummy variable, which equals one if the acquirer
and the target share the same primary four-digit SIC industry code and zero otherwise. We
calculate Cultural Distance (CD) based on Hofstede’s (2001) four cultural dimensions, using
the composite measure from Zhou et al. (2016). Specifically, for each M&A deal in our
dataset we compute the cultural distance as

, where

and

denote
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the cultural scores of the target and home (US) countries respectively. Kaufmann et al. (2011)
measure country governance quality using World Governance Indicators (published by the
World Bank) on control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability,
regulatory quality, rule of law, and voice and accountability. Following Ellis et al. (2017), we
measure Institutional Distance (ID) as the averaged differences between the target country’s
and the US’s scores on each dimension. We categorize ID into Downstream Institutional
Distance (IDD) when ID is negative and into Upstream Institutional Distance (IDU) when ID
is positive.

Control Variables
To control for pre-acquisition risk-magnitude effects and also to calibrate our sample to the
“regular” levels of systematic risk for each firm, we control for

, the acquirer’s

pre-M&A annualized risk during the six months prior to the announcement. We also expect
the broader economic conditions and the mergers market to play a significant role in forming
the acquirers’ post-merger risk reactions. Hence, we first employ the dummy variable
Recession, which takes the value one for deals that took place during the global financial
crisis of 2008-2010 and zero otherwise. Along the same lines, as merger waves are identified
as a key driver of takeover activity in the M&A literature, we use the dummy variable
Merger wave, which takes the value of one for deals that took place during 2003-2008 (the 6th
wave) and after 2012 (the still ongoing 7th wave) and zero otherwise. Following Han (2007),
we also control for changes in the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX), which represents the
average implied volatility of the at-the-money index options 30 days before expiration and is
therefore a valid proxy for the instantaneous volatility of the S&P 500 index. To proxy for
market sentiment, we employ the American Association of Individual Investors (AAII)
sentiment measure, deriving from a weekly (every Thursday) survey of individual investors,
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where responses are classified as bullish, bearish, or neutral. Following Fisher and Statman
(2006) and Kurov (2008), we compute an investor sentiment index as the number of bullish
investors expressed as a percentage of the number of bullish plus bearish investors. We match
both variables, ∆VIX and ∆Sentiment, to the event window of our dependent variable. ∆VIX
is therefore measured as the difference in VIX and ∆Sentiment as the difference in the mean
AAII sentiment, between 120 trading days after and 120 trading days prior to the
announcement.
We also control for deal-level variables that might confound our dependent variable.
We control for the percentage of the deal value paid in Cash, since stock payments can
reduce the information asymmetry by linking the payment to the target performance, while
cash payments indicate confidence on the part of the acquirer about the deal. We also control
for Relative Deal Size, the ratio of the total amount paid to the target, to the acquirer’s market
value at the year-end prior to the deal. In addition, the Percent of Shares Acquired indicates
the level of control the acquirer has over the target, which predicts the return and risk the
acquirer shares with the target. Firm-level variables expected to influence our dependent
variable are the acquirer’s Price/Book Ratio and Leverage (ratio of total debt to total assets).
The Price/Book Ratio is used to control for whether the acquirer’s stock is undervalued or
overvalued, while leverage is an important financial ratio predicting financial distress and
failure (Beaver, 1966).

Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 shows the distribution of the sample by various groups. It is important to note that
cross-border M&As, on average, generate a 0.18 (18%) significant increase in risk. Panel A
presents the sample distribution across target nations. The UK and Canada are the top two
target nations for US acquirers, making up 20% and 16% of our sample, respectively. In
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addition, on average, the most significant risk increase comes from deals targeted in India,
Italy, and Israel. While India, Italy, and Israel are the countries showing the greatest risk
increase, they share different levels of cultural distance and/or institutional distance with the
US. For example, India is very different in culture and institutions from the US, while Italy is
more similar to the US in both respects. However, the deals targeted in both India and Italy
show the largest increases in post-acquisition risk. Thus, preliminarily, cultural distance and
institutional distance cannot fully explain the increase in the acquirer’s risk. In the countries
at a high cultural distance from the US, we also see a worse institutional environment than
that of the US (e.g., Mexico has a score of 20.54 for cultural distance and one of -1.39 for
institutional distance). Panel B shows the distribution of the sample by acquirer’s industry.
The business services and electronic equipment industries account for the largest percentages,
at 21.1% and 12% of our sample. Pharmaceutical products, petroleum and natural gas, and
precious metals respectively make 50.7%, 54.3%, and 64% related acquisitions, while
banking acquirers make no related acquisitions. We cannot obtain a clear picture of the
relationship between related acquisitions and the risk increase from Panel B. We distribute
our sample by year in Panel C. The year 2008 sees a significant post-announcement risk
increase of 0.64, while 2009 shows a significant risk decrease of -0.30, mainly attributable to
the financial crisis. US cross-border acquirers in our sample also experienced significant risk
increases in 2000 and 2002, and a significant risk decrease in 2012.

------Insert Table 1 here-----

Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations among all variables.
The mean value of Industry Relatedness is 0.31, indicating that we have more unrelated than
related acquisitions in our sample. The mean of Absolute Institutional Distance is 0.481, and
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that of the indicator for Upstream deals is 0.67, which shows that US companies in our
sample predominately acquire targets in upstream countries (UK, Canada, Germany,
Australia), as is also shown in Table 1. Most of the deals are paid for in cash (93.32%) and
US acquirers, on average, pursue a large, controlling stake (86.49%). Cross-correlations in
the table are as expected and do not raise much concern about collinearity. It is noteworthy
that Cultural Distance and our Upstream deals indicator present a relatively high negative
correlation (-0.74), suggesting that target countries at a high cultural distance from the US in
general present a poorer institutional environment. As Ahern et al. (2015) point out, national
institutions are very likely interrelated with culture, such that cultural and institutional
distances can be jointly and endogenously determined. While it is not the purpose of our
study to make causal inferences between the two, high correlations across explanatory
variables raise collinearity concerns. To address such concerns, care was taken to ensure that,
in all econometric specifications, highly related terms were mean-centered and carefully
combined. The splitting of our institutional distance measure into upstream and downstream
measures (Kwok & Reeb, 2000) and the subsequent mean-centering of all distance scores
was applied to help reduce first-order correlations to acceptable levels, while variance
inflation factors (VIFs) were used to detect multicollinearity.

------ Insert Table 2 here ------

RESULTS
The results of the multivariate regression models are presented in Table 3. In the first column,
the base model shows the coefficient estimates for the benchmark specification with an
intercept and all control variables, for ∆Risk as the dependent variable. In column 2, the main
effects model includes the direct effects from the independent variables (IR, CD, IDD and
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IDU), including all controls and year fixed effects. In column 3, in the model labelled IR 
CD, we add the interaction term between Industry Relatedness and Cultural Distance. The
model named IR  ID (column 4) presents the main effects plus two separate interaction
terms between Industry Relatedness and Downstream Institutional Distance, and Industry
Relatedness and Upstream Institutional Distance. Finally, in column 5, the model denoted by
CD  ID shows the results for all main effects plus the two interaction terms between
Downstream Institutional Distance and Cultural Distance and between Upstream
Institutional Distance and Cultural Distance.

------ Insert Table 3 here ------

Several of our controls show significant effects on the acquirer’s risk change. Not
surprisingly, pre-M&A Risk (T-120, T-1) has a negative relationship with ∆Risk, and acts as an
effective control for the magnitude of the pre-acquisition (baseline) risk. Therefore, in the
presence of this control, the remaining variance in ∆Risk is net of confounding or scaling
properties. ∆VIX has a positive coefficient, suggesting that market volatility also amplifies an
acquirer’s shift in systematic risk in our sample. Meanwhile, ∆Sentiment has a negative effect
on ∆Risk, such that a generally bullish market sentiment reduces market risk. These controls
confirm the validity of our dependent variable. It is noteworthy that, while the effect of
Merger Wave is negative, the Recession dummy does not capture any of the acquirer’s risk
change, despite the fact that, in Table 1 (Panel C), ∆Risk appears to spike around the
recession period. We attribute this to the rather crude nature of the indicator variables, which
span several years and thus do not capture the intricacies that single-year dummies would. In
the subsequent estimations, we include year fixed effects to remedy this. According to the
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positive coefficient of Relative Deal Size, the acquirer’s risk also increases post acquisition if
the target size is large.
The two deal-level factors other than the relative deal size (percentage paid in cash
and percentage of shares acquired) are not significant. The reason might be that these two
variables do not present much variability in our sample of cross-border M&As. Apparently,
cross-border US acquirers, at least in our sample, generally prefer full cash as the payment
method (the mean and median of cash payment percentage are 93.32% and 100% as seen in
Table 2) and they tend to fully acquire the target firm (the mean and median of percentage of
shares acquired are 86.49% and 100%). Both firm-level controls, Price/Book Ratio and
Leverage, are not significant.
The model of main effects shows that the effect of Industry Relatedness (IR) is
positive and significant (β1 = 0.050, p<0.01), offering support to Hypothesis H1. As Industry
Relatedness is a dummy variable, the coefficient of 0.05, suggests a 5% ceteris paribus
increase in annualized risk for non-diversifying acquisitions, a value which is also
economically significant. Therefore, contrary to Lubatkin and O’Neill (1987), who found
relatedness to decrease risk in domestic acquisitions, we show that, in a cross-border context,
relatedness (on its own) has a rather adverse effect on risk. Meanwhile, Cultural Distance
(CD) and Institutional Distance (ID) do not appear – at least directly – to influence risk
changes. The coefficient of cultural distance on the acquirer’s risk change is nearly zero and
insignificant, showing that cultural distance at a country level does not appear to further
amplify the increased risk stemming from cultural difference at an organizational level.
Whether the nature of the effect of the two layers of “double-layered acculturation” is
supplementary or complementary would be a rather interesting item for future investigations.
Institutional distance both downstream and upstream decrease the acquirer’s post-acquisition
risk, but the effects are not significant. One explanation could be that country-level
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uncertainties alone do not necessarily pose difficulties or generate opportunities for acquirers.
Acquirers need to exploit the integration effect between external (country-level) and internal
(firm-level) risk factors to achieve a reduction in risk.
With the introduction of the first interaction term (model 3: IR  CD) into our model,
after grand-mean-centering CD, the results of the main factors do not change, while the
interaction term (IR  CD) has a negative effect on the risk change (β5 = -0.01, p<0.01), in
support of H5. Thus, in cross-border M&As, relatedness and cultural distance complement
each other in producing a risk reduction. As Figure 1 also illustrates, acquirers can best
mitigate cross-border acquisition risks when they bid for related targets from culturally
distant countries or unrelated targets from culturally proximate countries. In line with the
integrated risk management perspective, the results support that the sources of risk behind the
two layers of “double-layered acculturation” can simultaneously balance off against each
other, reducing overall post-acquisition risk.

------ Insert Figure 1 here ------

In column 4 of Table 3 (model IR x ID), the results support that US acquirers can
mitigate their risk from related acquisitions by bidding for institutionally distant targets from
either downstream (β6 = -0.177, p<0.01) or upstream (β7 = -0.401, p<0.05) countries.
Therefore, H6 and H7 are both supported, while – also in line with our expectations – the
effects on the upstream and downstream sides differ in magnitude. Since the effect size of
Upstream is around three times bigger than that of Downstream, acquirers enjoy the greatest
risk reduction by acquiring related targets from upstream countries with higher institutional
distance. Thus, the “liability of foreignness” can act as an effective risk mitigation scenario
for related acquisitions, as is also shown in Figure 2.

- 43 -

------ Insert Figure 2 here ------

Finally, the results in column 5 (model ID x CD) support that bidders experience
systematic risk declines when the targets are from upstream countries (β9 = -0.041, p<0.1), in
support of H9. However, it appears that, for downstream targets, no combination of cultural
and institutional distance distinctly influences post-acquisition risk, as we can also see from
the interaction plots in Figure 3. Therefore, H8 is not supported. It can be argued that
downstream institutions have more volatile business environments, higher customer risks,
and political uncertainties, which firms from upstream countries are not always equipped to
address (Kwok & Reeb, 2000). Since the “liability of foreignness” coming from downstream
institutions cannot be mitigated by “double-layered acculturation”, firms may be better off
engaging alternative internal mechanisms, such as the ones suggested by the governance
literature, i.e., contingent payouts (Reuer et al., 2004). For all the estimated models in Table
3, we also report mean VIFs. Since the mean VIFs do not exceed 2 in any of the models, we
are confident that collinearity is not an issue.

------ Insert Figure 3 here ------

ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
In Table 4, we illustrate the results from six sets of robustness checks.
First, we use an alternative measure of institutional distance. Instead of the six
dimensions from the World Governance Indicators we employ scores from the Fraser
Institute’s World Economic Freedom Index (Aybar & Ficici, 2009; North, 1990; Zhou et al.,
2016). The index is a scalar variable ranging from 1 (low level of institutional development)
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to 10 (high level of institutional development). For each deal in our sample, we calculate the
difference in the scores for the target’s and the acquirer’s country as EFI distance. The results
are quite robust (columns 1-3) and while support for H1 is weak, the key risk mitigation
hypotheses (H5, H6, H8, and H9) are supported.
Second, we use Altman Z-scores (Altman, 1968) as an alternative approach to crossborder acquirer risk. Altman’s Z-score – widely used as a risk measure across finance and
accounting – indicates a firm’s likelihood of bankruptcy (Agarwal & Taffler, 2007; Reynolds
& Francis, 2000) and is estimated as
(3)
where X1 = Working Capital / Total Assets
X2 = Retained Earnings / Total Assets
X3 = Earnings before Interest and Taxes / Total Assets
X4 = Market Value of Equity/Book Value of Total Debt
X5 = Sales / Total Assets
For each acquirer in our sample, we first calculate Z-scores one year prior to the
announcement (Y-1) and one year after the announcement (Y+1), and then employ the
difference between these scores ΔZ (Y-1,Y+1) as a new dependent variable in eq. 5. The mean
(median) pre-acquisition Z-score is 4.013 (3.454) and the mean (median) change ΔZ (Y-1,Y+1)
is -0.641 (-0.220). Since a lower Z-score suggests a higher likelihood of bankruptcy, the
negative values of ΔZ (Y-1,Y+1) are perfectly in line with the general increases in ΔRisk, the
change in the annualized systematic risk of the acquirer’s stock returns around the M&A
announcement, as observed in Table 1. The coefficient estimates in columns 4-6 show that,
while the main effects hypotheses (H1-H4) are not supported, coefficients

,

,

, and

are positive and significant (at least at 10%), suggesting that combinations of external
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uncertainties can indeed moderate acquirers’ post-merger risk and reduce the likelihood of
bankruptcy.
The third set of robustness checks involves limiting our original sample to serial
acquirers (i.e., acquirers that had completed at least one cross-border M&A already), to test
the consistency of the empirical results for experienced acquirers. The results on the
remaining 1,099 deals, shown under columns 7-9, offer support to H5, H6, and H9,
suggesting that the integrated risk perspective generally holds for serial/experienced
acquirers.
Furthermore, in line with common practice in the M&A empirical literature, we
exclude acquisitions by banks, insurance companies, and financial firms (Fama-French
Industry Group 17: Banks, Insurance Companies, and Other Financials). Financials usually
present increased leverage and particular risk characteristics (Fama & French, 1992), while
they are also often subject to complex domestic and international regulatory backdrops. To
ensure that such skewed financial fundamentals and external influences do not drive our
results, we exclude 122 deals from our original sample. In columns 10-12, where we reestimate the full model from eq. 5, the majority of our hypotheses (H1, H5, H6, H7, and H9)
are supported for the remaining 1,771 cross-border acquisitions in our sample.
Finally, given the noteworthy concentration of cross-border targets in the UK (369)
and Canada (298), we deemed it necessary to eliminate the possibility that the empirical
results were driven by the dominance of these major target markets. As both these target
countries present better institutional development than the US (positive institutional
distance), there is a risk that H7 (IR  DU) and H9 (CD  IDU) in particular – which predict
that risks from industry relatedness and cultural distance can be mitigated by upstream
institutional distance – may no longer hold once these countries are excluded from the
analysis. In columns 13-15, where we omit UK deals, although H1 and H7 are rejected, the
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key hypotheses H5, H6, and H9 are still supported. These results suggest that, while in the
absence of UK deals certain effects are weaker, the integrated risk approach remains an
effective risk mitigation mechanism for all other target countries. In columns 16-18, we
exclude the Canadian target deals and all results are qualitatively identical to those of the full
sample in Table 3.

------ Insert Table 4 here ------

DISCUSSION
In this article, we address a gap in the IB literature by investigating the risk side of
performance in a cross-border M&A context. We find that the systematic risk of US acquirers
of foreign firms rises by about 18% on average during the post-acquisition period. Building
on Miller (1992), we theorize and test the integrated risk management perspective in the
domain of international M&As. Specifically, we exploit the simultaneous trade-offs among
the risks of adverse selection and moral hazard, “double-layered acculturation”, and the
“liability of foreignness”.
Information asymmetry is a fundamental factor leading to the risk of adverse
selection. Industry relatedness should decrease the risk of adverse selection, since the
acquirer is familiar with the target’s business. Nonetheless, acquirers of related targets aim to
achieve operational synergies, and are thus likely to attempt a large degree of consolidation.
In an international context, high integration and implementation costs do not enable acquirers
to realize operational synergy, especially when they become overconfident about their
knowledge of the target and underestimate the challenges; the hubris, driven up by related
acquisitions, therefore leads to risk increases for international acquirers.

- 47 -

In cross-border M&As, external factors, such as “double-layered acculturation” and
the “liability of foreignness” further intensify acquirers’ risk by exacerbating and
complicating the above internal factors of adverse selection and moral hazard. Nonetheless,
our results support that external uncertainties, if configured suitably with internal ones, can
mitigate acquirers’ risk in international M&As. With cultural awareness, acquirers can
leverage high cultural distance to control industry-relatedness risks. After extending the
upstream-downstream hypothesis of Kwok and Reeb (2000) to also account for the direction
and magnitude of institutional distance, we find that firms do not necessarily expose
themselves to more risk when they engage in acquisitions of downstream targets. However,
institutional distance, as the key driver behind “liability of foreignness”, can mitigate
acquirers’ risk from related acquisitions; thus, external uncertainty can mitigate acquirers’
risk stemming from internal factors. In addition, we show that –irrespective of target
relatedness- upstream acquirers can further mitigate post acquisition risks by
internationalizing into culturally distant countries. However, at least from a risk management
perspective, we do not find benefits to downstream acquirers who internationalize into
countries with both high cultural and institutional distance.
Our results strengthen Miller’s (1992) integrated risk management perspective of IB
and offer strong support for the notion that risk factors are interactive and cannot be managed
alone. As we show, acquirers’ cross-border risk is an outcome of complementary and
competing effects from such factors as adverse selection, moral hazard problems, cultural
distance, and institutional distance. Therefore, our results complement existing research in IB
(i.e. Lubatkin & O’Neill, 1987) and international finance (Ahern et al., 2015; Siegel et al.,
2011), which examine the influences of cultural and institutional distance in isolation of
internal uncertainties.

- 48 -

One limitation of our study is our use of a sample of US acquirers only. In our study,
both cultural and institutional distance are measured against the US. This may limit the
applicability of integrated risk management to US acquirers. Future research could examine
the research questions in a global M&A context where acquirers are from multiple countries.
Furthermore, although our sector-based proxy for industry relatedness is in line with the vast
majority of the extant M&A empirical research, it may not completely capture the degree of
organizational similarity in business traits and goals. To fully measure how acquirers and
targets share strategic interdependence, redeploy resources, and combine at an operating
level, we would need primary proprietary data from internal firm sources, which are not
widely available. Further research might focus on developing reliable and precise proxies for
operational similarity.
Our study opens several important avenues for future research. First, future research
could investigate the application of integrated risk management in the context of other
internationalization strategies (e.g., international joint ventures) or with other types of
uncertainties (e.g., political risk). Miller (1992) suggests a variety of levels of uncertainties
firms face when internationalizing, thus offering a very solid foundation for future studies.
Second, we open a research stream focused on studying and quantifying strategic
international risks. With the volatile global environment, as well as the drastic development
of technology, risk mitigation plays an increasingly critical role in firms’ internationalization.
Our measure of risk offers a sound empirical foundation for a more holistic examination of
firms’ strategic international risks. Third, in this paper we focus on industry relatedness as the
primary indicator of firm-level differences. Future research could examine the effects of the
inner layer of “double-layered acculturation” (i.e. organizational-level cultural distance) to
proxy for information asymmetry and moral hazard. Lastly, with the help of our theoretical
extensions and empirical approach, future research may study the aptness of the integrated
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risk management perspective on international M&A failure. In other words, does the trade-off
among diverse risk factors reduce the probability of cross-border M&A failure? If so, how
can international acquirers manage those risk factors?

MANAGERIAL RELEVANCE
Our study provides practical implications for international acquirers, who can mitigate their
overall risk by integrating various risk factors. To leverage their exposure to uncertainties
such as information asymmetry, moral hazard, and country-level differences, acquirers can
utilize the trade-offs across their respective indicators: industry relatedness, cultural distance,
and institutional distance. The simultaneous trade-offs across these indicators can provide
acquirers with several scenarios for risk mitigation (see Table 5 for a taxonomy and
illustrations): in Scenario I, when an acquirer wishes to target a firm in a similar line of
business (i.e. High IR), overall post-acquisition risk can be reduced if the target is in a
culturally distant country (High CD). In Scenario II, overall acquirer risk also decreases if a
similar target is from a country with a very different institutional environment (High ID),
particularly a better one. On the other hand, when merging with or taking over a firm in a
different industry, overall risk is mitigated when the target is from a proximate cultural
(Scenario III) or institutional (Scenario IV) background. Therefore, when an acquirer
increases their exposure to information asymmetry and moral hazard – by acquiring a target
from a different industry – they should decrease their exposure to the “liability of
foreignness” and “double-layered acculturation” – by acquiring a target from a similar culture
and institutional environment. Also, in Scenarios V and VI, when an acquirer wants to
purchase a target from a foreign country in order to diversify their overall risk, it will be more
rewarding to choose a target from a country which is both culturally and institutionally
different. In other words, when aiming to diversify risk via overseas acquisitions, firms
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should seek to increase their exposure to both cultural and institutional uncertainties,
especially when they come from countries with better institutions.
Of course, not all uncertainty exposures should necessarily be eliminated, since risktaking is an important element of the returns generation process in business. However, in
scanning for cross-border M&A targets, the exploitation of trade-offs across the
aforementioned uncertainties can provide acquirers with the advantage of risk mitigation
before they have to invest in a sunk cost. In conclusion, we recommend that acquirers
establish uncertainty exposure profiles for international M&As to help optimize their riskadjusted returns.

------ Insert Table 5 here ------
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ESSAY II:
MITIGATING THE RISK OF DEAL ABANDONMENT IN
INTERNATIONAL MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS:
THE ROLE OF OPERATIONAL RISK

ABSTRACT
Why do firms abandon international mergers and acquisitions (M&As) despite of the
substantial transaction cost? M&As may fall through because of the release of new and
unexpected information after the public announcement. At country level, institutional theory
helps us understand the exacerbated effect of formal and informal institutional constraints on
information asymmetry between international acquires and targets. Building on institutional
theory and information asymmetry argument, we apply the concept of operational risk as the
contingency of country governance quality and the likelihood of deal withdrawal. Operational
risk provides us a contemporary measure of organizational behavior under the various “rules
of the game”. Using panel data method and a sample of 8,008 cross-border deals which
includes 1,744 country pairs during 1996—2016, we find that acquiring country’s
governance quality decreases the likelihood of deal withdrawal, and the risk mitigating effect
is even stronger when the selling country has a strong governance mechanism as well, or
when the acquiring country has high operational risk, or when the selling country has lower
operational risk.

Keywords: mergers and acquisitions; international; institutional environment; country
governance; operational risk; deal abandonment
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INTRODUCTION
International mergers and acquisitions (M&As), as a popular mode of entry, provide
multinational enterprises (MNEs) from either developed or emerging markets an important
means to obtain complementary resources and capabilities, and to become more
internationally competitive. However, more than 40% of international M&As fail either
before or after the deal is completed (Mukherji, Dibrell, & Francis, 2013). In the precompletion stage, studies have shown that around 20% of the M&A announcements end up
being withdrawn (Bates & Lemmon, 2003; Holl & Kyriazis, 1996). Deal withdrawal or deal
abandonment incurs a large amount of costs including upfront costs in target selection and
professional services (Bainbridge, 1990), costs of revealing private information (Officer,
2003), opportunity costs (Bainbridge, 1990), the cost of breaching the contract (e.g.,
termination fees) and reputational losses (He & Zhang, 2018). In this article, we focus on
explaining the reasons an international M&A gets abandoned in the pre-completion stage
through traditional and contemporary country-level factors.
Literature on post-acquisition performance is abundant (see review studies Haleblian
et al., 2009; Martynova & Renneboog, 2008; Shimizu et al., 2004; Tuch & O’Sullivan, 2007).
However, we know little about the likelihood of deal completion. Most of these studies
examining the likelihood of deal closing focus on domestic M&As. The finance, accounting,
and strategy scholars study a number of deal-level, firm-level, and country-level factors
influencing the deal completion. At deal level, scholars have studied the impact of method of
payment (Luypaert & De Maeseneire, 2015), deal hostility (Ngo & Susnjara, 2016),
termination fee (Officer, 2003). At firm level, we have investigated such factors as
acquisition experience (Muehlfeld, Rao Sahib, & Van Witteloostuijn, 2012), target firm
accounting quality (Marquardt & Zur, 2014), interfirm status differentials (Shen, Tang, &
Chen, 2014), board composition (Brickley, Coles, & Terry, 1994), state ownership of the
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acquirers (Li, Xia, & Lin, 2017), and geographic distance (Chakrabarti & Mitchell, 2016). In
cross-border M&As, we have been focusing on the impact of institutional distance or
institutional development on deal completion (Dikova, Rao Sahib, & Van Witteloostuijn,
2010; He & Zhang, 2018; Kim & Song, 2017; Zhou, Xie, & Wang, 2016).
Drawing on information asymmetry argument, we extend institutional theory by
connecting the “rules of the game” (North, 1990) of a country with contemporary
organizational behaviors, operational risk. Operational risk is defined as “the losses resulting
from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events”
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision [BCBS], 2004). It is measured from firms’
operational loss events due to one or a combination of such reasons as employee errors,
system failures, technology malfunction, and internal fraud etc. Under three pillars of the
regulatory, cognitive, and normative, a strong country governance system provides the firms
a business environment with less transaction costs and uncertainty, and more knowledge
sharing and information flow (Scott, 1995). Institutional theory offers us the environmental
explanations on how MNEs perform in their internationalization process (Dikova et al., 2010;
Kostova & Dacin, 2008). However, both formal institutional constraints (such as regulations,
rules, and laws) and informal institutional constraints (such as shared values, conventions,
and codes of conduct) play parts of the incomplete and imperfect information between
acquirers and targets in international M&As.
Information asymmetry is the main culprit of deal abandonment. The acquirer could
not have a full picture of the target’s firm information, preferences, and incentives before the
public announcement. A deal withdrawal usually occurs because of the release of unexpected
information after the announcement (Davidson III, Rosentein, & Sundaram, 2002; Hotchkiss,
Qian, & Song, 2005). The reasons for the revealing of new information could be (1) there is a
misunderstanding of the information shared; (2) unanticipated regulatory changes; (3) the
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acquirer made mistakes or did not evaluate the target’s information as fully and precisely as
the acquirer should; (4) the target firm intentionally hid or fabricated its information before
the announcement in order to sell or sell at a high premium (Akerlof, 1970; Anagnostopoulou
& Tsekrekos, 2015; Reuer, 2005). While institutional theory provides us the environmental
explanations on reason one and two because organizations are “purposive entities designed
by their creators to maximize wealth, income, or other objectives defined by the opportunities
afforded by the institutional structure of the society” (North, 1990: 73), operational risk helps
us dive into the behavioral aspects of information asymmetry regarding the imperfect
information on what checklist the acquirer should evaluate (e.g., reason three) and what the
target firm has done in the past (e.g., reason four).
Using a sample of 8,008 cross-border M&As which includes 1,744 country pairs
(target nation and acquirer nation) during 1996 to 2016, we find that the better the acquiring
(i.e., acquirer’s) country’s governance quality is, the lower the likelihood of the deal
abandonment. Furthermore, when the selling (i.e., target’s) country’s governance quality is
also high, the acquiring country’s governance quality decreases even more of the likelihood
of the deal abandonment. When the target governance (i.e., selling country’s governance
quality) is low, the deal is more likely to withdraw despite of the level of the acquirer
governance (i.e., acquiring country’s governance quality). Instead of examining the effect of
institutional environment through institutional distances as an approach of differences, we
precisely investigate the individual effect of acquirer country’s and target country’s
institutional development, and we find more methodological reliable and practitioner friendly
risk mitigation scenarios (Edwards, 2001). Additionally, the level of acquiring or selling
country’s operational risk has different moderating effect on the acquirer governance as well.
When the acquirer is from a country with strong governance mechanisms as well as high
operational risk, the acquirer is less likely to abandon the deal with the foreign target. The
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acquirer transferred its learning from its or others’ operational loss events to acquisitions and
is more prepared and cautious in target selection and evaluation. However, in comparison,
when the target is from a country with high operational risk, the acquiring country’s
governance quality would not have a as strong effect on mitigating the deal closing risk. A
target from high operational risk environment tends to fabricate its firm information, have
reputational losses which triggers a negative market reaction to the M&A announcement, and
thus diminishing the risk mitigating effect of acquiring country’s governance quality.
Our study provides two contributions. First, we extend the scope and effect of
institutional theory in firm internationalization strategy by cooperating the role of another
contemporary country-level factor, operational risk. Institutional theory has provided us the
environmental explanations through countries’ regulative, normative, and cognitive pillars in
international business activities (North 1990; Scott, 1995). Institutional distance, as the key
driver of “liability of foreignness” (Eden & Miller, 2004), offers rich and meaningful insights
on the performance and strategy making of firms’ internationalization. Although
organizations are assumed to modify “in the direction of increasing compatibility with
environmental characteristics” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p.149), organizations and
employees are subjective and “act on their own perceptions and act in unpredictable as well
as predictable ways” (Astley & Van De Ven, 1983). By applying the concept of operational
risk, we combine the “rules of the game” and organizational actions, enriching the
institutional theory with a behavioral aspect or a measured outcome of enforcement.
Operational risk is a contemporary measure of organizational behavior and country-level
variations, which further helps the institutional theory to identify the co-evolutionary and
dynamic effect between MNEs activities and governance development.
Second, we disentangle the institutional distance by examining the direct and
interaction effect between acquiring country’s and selling country’s governance quality on

- 56 -

the likelihood of international deal completion, which is a more mythological reliable and
practitioner friendly approach. The approach of using difference scores (i.e., institutional
distance) produces a lower reliability than either of the two component measures (Edwards,
2001). Moreover, the distance approach does not have a clear managerial implication as in
how big of an institutional distance is high or small and which country minus which. In this
article, we provide the simple direct effect of acquiring country’s governance quality on the
likelihood of deal completion, with either selling country’s governance quality in presence or
absence, and, if in presence, the score range from World Governance Indicator (WGI) to
mitigate the deal closing risk.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we discuss the
theoretical framework and put forward testable hypotheses. Then, we present our empirical
data and methodology. The fourth section illustrates the results and the fifth provides
robustness checks to support our empirical results. The last section concludes with the
discussion of our theoretical and managerial contributions, limitations, and the future
research directions that we implied.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Information Asymmetry in International M&As
An M&A process, before the deal completion, has two stages called private and public
takeover process (Boone & Mulherin, 2007). During the private takeover process, the bidder
sets its own search criteria, receives private information from the seller (target) that it is
interested in buying, evaluates the seller, and thus makes the initial offer/announcement
(Dikova et al., 2010). After the public announcement, the public takeover process is
exhaustive and usually takes several months to complete. The two firms continue to receive
new information as the negotiation and due diligence extend (Hotchkiss, Qian, & Song,
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2017). The release of new information demands a renegotiation and repricing between two
firms. When the two firms cannot agree on the final price by the due date and leave both
parties dissatisfied, the deal gets abandoned (Davidson III, Rosenstein, & Sundaram, 2002;
Kim & Song, 2017). Thus, any unexpected information released during public takeover
process can be detrimental for the deal closing (Mitchell & Pulvino, 2001).
Information asymmetry is the very first factor determining the likelihood of deal
success (Akerlof, 1970; Kim & Song, 2017). The reasons for the release or identification of
new information after rather than before the public announcement can be summarized into
three. First, the acquirer and/or the target have difficulties accessing to the accurate
evaluations because of the institutional distance, underdeveloped institutional systems, or
institutional voids (Khanna & Palepu, 2000a, b; Kim & Song, 2017; Ragozzino & Reuer,
2011). Second, the acquirer did not have a comprehensive checklist while evaluating the
target during the private takeover process due to managers’ hubris or lack of knowledge in
M&A process. After the announcement, the acquirers often hire professional advisors to do
thorough due diligence, which can identify new and unexpected information about the target
company. Third, the seller/target intentionally hides or fabricates its firm information in order
to sell the company at a high premium to the bidder/acquirer (Anagnostopoulou & Tsekrekos,
2015; Reuer, 2005). While institutional theory helps us understand the first reason for
information asymmetry between two firms, operational risk provides us new lens revealing
the second and third reason.
According to North’s (1990) political economy theory, country governance (i.e., rules
of the game) serves the business activities with less uncertainty and transaction costs. Both
the formal and informal institutional constraints vary across countries. While international
M&As face substantial regulatory scrutiny and transactional complexity, strong institutional
governance mechanisms from at least one party of the cross-border deal help with the
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takeover process. Well-developed institutional environment protects the investment and
shareholders, creates a transparent platform for the firms to share information, and therefore
has low information asymmetry with other countries. Scholars find that institutional distance
between two parties have negative effect on deal completion (Dikova et al., 2010; He &
Zhang, 2018; Lim & Lee, 2017; Zhou et al., 2016). Despite that country governance quality
increases information sharing and facilitates the process of deal completion, the explanatory
effect is contingent on the degree of enforcement of “rules of the game”. “Rules of the game”
provide the accessibility to the information, while the players’ actions are the realized
information learning activities. In this article, we investigate the players’ actions through their
operational loss events, which could help us understand more with the reasons for the
revealing of new, unexpected information.

The Definition and Literature Review of Operational Risk
Operational risk is the risk of (operational) losses from the failure of people, process, systems
and external factors. The term “operational risk” was born in 1990s. The tipping point for
‘operational risk’ to get interests from practitioners and researchers is when Barings was
brought down by Nick Lesson. Basel Committee classified operational risk into the following
event types: (1) internal fraud, (2) external fraud, (3) employment practices and workplace
safety, (4) clients, products and business practices, (5) damage to physical assets, (6) business
disruption and system failures, (7) execution, delivery and process management (please see
Table 6 for detailed definitions and examples). Some examples of operational loss events
include technology failure, improper business practices, employment discrimination,
employee errors etc.

--------Insert Table 6 here-------- 59 -

Based on BCBS’s classification, Moosa and Li (2013) categorize operational risk
under four headings: people risk, technology risk, process risk, and external risk. People risk
arises from human error, employee misdeeds, and inadequate employee development and
recruitment. Thus, people risk, defined as the major source of operational losses, is highly
associated with corporate governance, corruption, ethical standards, internal controls within
firms and management style. Process risk results from inefficiency or ineffectiveness in
value-driving processes (i.e., sales and marketing, product development and customer
support) and value-supporting processes (i.e., human resources and legal matters). System (or
technology) risk arises from the system breakdown, data quality and poor project
management, which depends on the state of technology. External risk is caused by
macroeconomic and socioeconomic events as well as the actions of external parties (e.g.,
external fraud). Thus, external risk is determined by the economic fluctuation, regulatory
change, and environmental standards. The classification from Moosa and Li (2013) extends
the operational risk concept from banking industry to all other industries.
In finance and banking literature, scholars study the determinants, consequences, and
modeling of operational risk. They demonstrate that operational loss events do not only cause
company a fortune by the loss amount, but also impact stock market reaction and generate
reputational losses (Cummins, Lewis, & Wei, 2006; Karpoff & Lott, 1993; Perry & De
Fontnouvelle, 2005). Cummins et al. (2006) find that the decline in market value after the
operational loss announcement significantly exceeds the operational loss amount. Operational
risk thus has a spillover effect. In order to mitigate operational risk, finance scholars have
proposed various quantification methods using operational loss events data: extreme value
theory, dependent risk processes, operational Value at Risk, and aggregation measures
(Chavez-Demoulin, Embrechts, & Hofert, 2016; Chavez-Demoulin, Embrechts, &

- 60 -

Nešlehová, 2006; Cruz, 2002). Furthermore, corporate governance is found to be the most
impactful determinant of the quality of internal control as well as operational risk (Chernobai,
Jorion, & Yu, 2011).
Companies in all industries and countries nowadays are suffering from operational
loss events. With the development of technology, the growth of e-commerce, large-scale
M&As, and increased outsourcing, operational risk becomes a business concern for all
industries in every country (Alexander, 2003). Moosa (2007) also suggests that organizations
expose themselves to operational risk more with increasing dependence on technology,
intense competition, and globalization. After conducting the cross-country comparison, Cope,
Piche, and Walter (2012) find that countries share different operational loss event types in
dominance because of the country difference in governance quality and GDP per capita.
Moosa and Li (2013) argue that the frequency and severity of operational loss events are
significantly related to country-level factors.

HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Acquirer’s Country Governance
According to institutional theory, institutions that comprise the rules of a society or “humanly
devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 1990). “Rules of the game” vary
across nations. Scholars find that the better quality of the acquirer’s country governance is,
the higher chance of deal completion (Ellis et al., 2017; Lim & Lee, 2017; Zhou, Xie, &
Wang, 2016). With strong governance mechanisms to control for the managerial discretion,
managers are less likely to act on acquisitions without exhaustive appraisal processes. With
the absence of strong governance quality, acquirers’ managers are more likely to make hubris
acquisition decisions under which the managers make mistakes in selecting and evaluating
target firms (Seth, Song, & Pettit, 2002). After the announcement, if the professional
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services’ due-diligence finds out new information, the deal gets abandoned. In other words,
acquirers from better institutional environment have more discretion in targets selection,
evaluation, pricing, and due diligence process, which minimizes the possibility of new and
unexpected information coming up after the public announcement, and thus improving the
chance of deal completion.
Institutional environment helps reduce the information asymmetry between acquirers
and targets (Dikova et al., 2010; Kim & Song, 2017). Institutions serve the firms with
reducing the uncertainty and transaction costs by enforcing rules and regulations (North,
1990). Less developed institutions do not only create higher enforcement and measurement
costs, but also greater amount of information asymmetry (Akerlof, 1970). Further, better
country governance means that firms can have access to sufficient contracting devices that
are not available with poorer governance (Ellis et al., 2017), which facilitates the public
takeover process and helps overcome risks of incomplete contracting (Coase, 1937;
Williamson, 1979). In addition, finance and law literature find that firms in better country
governance have more access to funding (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny,
1998), which is essential for an international M&A to complete after necessary renegotiation. Many international deals failed to complete due to the premium pricing during
public takeover process. Access to funding helps acquirers to pay the target at a re-negotiated
and new price that is higher than the public announcement price. Therefore, we propose that
acquirers’ country governance decreases the likelihood of deal withdrawal.

H1. The better the Acquirer’s Country Governance, the lower the likelihood of Deal
Withdrawal
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Acquirer’s and Target’s Country Governance
When the acquirers are from well-developed institutions, the international M&As would be
more likely to complete if the targets also have strong governance mechanisms. Scholars find
that high institutional distance decreases the likelihood of deal completion (Dikova et al.,
2010; He & Zhang, 2018; Lim & Lee, 2017; Zhou et al., 2016). Zhou et al. (2016) especially
find that, for emerging markets’ multinational corporations (EMNCs), institutional distance
decreases the likelihood of deal completion more when the EMNCs are being purchased by
buyers from developed economies but less when the EMNCs are purchasing targets from
developed economies. The institutional quality of the host or target country has a positive
effect on the likelihood of deal completion and the deal performance (Aybar & Ficici, 2009;
Gubbi et al., 2010; Zhang, Zhou, & Ebbers, 2011). When the targets are from less developed
institutions, businesses may be conducted based on vague and personalized interpretations
rather than the structured and standardized legislations and regulations in more developed
institutions (Henisz & Zelner, 2010). The poorly defined business environment will create
misunderstandings and misinterpretations for the acquirers that are from developed
institutions during the negotiation and due diligence process and the acquirers will
consequently be more likely to withdraw from the deal.
More institutionally developed economies are more likely to provide protections for
investments, share tangible and intangible knowledge (Berry, 2006), and less costly
information (Khana & Palepu, 2000a, b). Specifically, at the private and public takeover
processes, target firms from more developed institutions are more transparent and qualified
with their accounting and finance information. The quality of targeting firms’ accounting
significantly increases the likelihood of deal completion (Marquardt & Zur, 2014). The
acquirers will have less information asymmetry with the target, which means acquirers will
be less likely to find out unexpected information about the target firm after the public
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announcement. With weak governance mechanisms, the corporate disclosure system may be
underdeveloped, which limits the pre-due diligence scope and thus generates biased
evaluations (Kim & Song, 2017). In addition, weak institutional environment often entails
more unpredictability in regulatory and legal systems. When the targets are from less
developed institutions, it is more likely for acquirers to encounter unexpected changes (e.g.,
unusual policy changes by the target country government) after the public announcement
(Zhou et al., 2016). Therefore, when the quality of acquirers’ country governance is high but
that of targets’ is not, there would be more information asymmetry and learning obstacles
between two parties, and thus a higher probability of deal withdrawal.

H2. The relationship between Acquirer’s Country Governance and Deal Withdrawal
is stronger when the Target’s Country Governance is higher rather than lower.

Acquirer’s Country Governance and Acquirer’s Operational Risk
The M&A deal gets abandoned after public announcement usually because of the new and
unexpected information released. One reason for the revealing of new information is that
acquirer did not do an exhaustive evaluation of the target before making the offer because of
the acquirer’s lack of experience. Another reason is that the deal is not a well-proposed one
because of managerialism (acquirer’s managers did not carefully select the target with
shareholders’ interest in mind) or hubris (acquirer’s managers are overconfident). With a
strong country governance mechanism, the acquirer tends to have more managerial
discretion, which decreases the chance of “bad lemon” selection (Akerlof, 1970), thus
increasing the likelihood of deal completion. Moreover, the likelihood will be even more
elevated when the acquirer country’s operational risk is higher rather than lower.
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When the acquiring country’s operational risk is higher, meaning many firms located
in the country have severely realized operational losses from events such as internal or
external fraud, employee errors, product deficiencies, and accounting churnings etc. The
business environment of high operational risk prepares the acquirer with more experience in
risk management, employee training, and operational execution, which in turn helps the
acquirer develop a more comprehensive checklist for its target selection and evaluation.
Caterpillar, U.S. heavy-equipment behemoth, acquired ERA Mining Machinery Ltd, a
Chinese coal-mine company, for $677 million in 2012. The deal was perceived as an easymoney. Ironically, the “easy-money” part was exactly the problem leading the deal to a
failure: “due diligence oversights on Caterpillar’s part and alleged deliberate, multi-year,
coordinated accounting misconduct” (CB Insights, 2016). When the acquirers from countries
with strong governance and high operational risk, the acquirers tend to have more
competitive capabilities in strict target selection and assessment, thus increasing the
likelihood of deal completion.

H3. The relationship between Acquirer’s Country Governance and Deal Withdrawal
is stronger when the Acquirer’s Operational Risk is higher rather than lower.

Acquirer’s Country Governance and Target’s Operational Risk
“Rules of the game” serve the firms and people with well-defined boxes and arrows. Scott
(1995) defines three pillars of the institutional framework—regulatory, cognitive, and
normative, which includes rules and social values. Organizations are modified to be complied
and compatible with these institutional coercive, mimetic, and normative pressures
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). When an acquirer purchases a target from a different institution,
acquirers could learn about the three-pillar pressures and has a rough perception about the
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target firm’s organizational structure, principles, and characteristics because of the
isomorphism (Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 2008; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). However, the
system-structural view (organizational behavior is seen to be shaped by a series of
impersonal mechanisms that act as external constraints on actors) does not fully predict that
all employees would behave in a conformity and coherence manner. According to action
theory, employees or individuals act on their own perceptions and behave in unpredictable as
well as predictable fashions (Astley & Van De Ven, 1983). Thus, the acquirer could not have
full knowledge of the personnel action or employee behavior within the target firm.
Operational risk is a helpful measure for that.
“The definition of operational risk tells us that a major source of operational risk is
people risk—the risk of incurring losses because of the failure of people in the sense of
having criminal tendencies or because they are incompetent” (Li & Moosa, 2015). When the
targets’ operational risk is high, the employees are more likely to fail to meet obligations to
clients or product designs, more likely to make mistakes in practices or task deliveries, and
more likely to commit frauds and violations even with acquirer’s strong governance
mechanisms. In addition, under high operational risk, firms may have fabricated their
financial and accounting information in order to sell at a higher price. The information hidden
or fabricated can be some operational losses from employment practices, system or process
errors etc. During the public takeover process, acquirers usually execute an even more
thorough on-site due diligence review, which could potentially reveal more unexpected
information about the target firm if the targeted country has high operational risk. Moreover,
operational risk leads to high reputational loss (Cummins et al., 2006; Karpoff & Lott, 1993;
Perry & De Fontnouvelle, 2005). When the targets are from countries with low reputation in
doing business in, the deal announcement will have negative market reactions which puts
pressure on two parties and impedes the deal completion process. Therefore, we propose that
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when the target is from a country with high operational risk, the risk mitigating effect of
acquirer’s country governance on deal abandonment will be weakened.

H4. The relationship between Acquirer’s Country Governance and Deal Withdrawal
is stronger when the Target’s Operational Risk is lower rather than higher.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The Sample of Cross-Border M&As and Operational Loss Events
We collected cross-border M&A deals data on international acquirers and targets from
Thomson EIKON Deals (formerly Thomson One - SDC). Our original data included all
announced deals (completed and withdrawn) during the period 1995-2017, where the acquirer
or the target was from any country and the deal must be international (i.e., the acquirer’s
country is different from the target’s country). The size of the deal had to exceed $1 million.
Additionally, we collected the data of global operational loss events from SAS software. The
original dataset covers 34,780 operational loss events that occurred from 1900 to early 2017
in 141 countries. The data includes such variables as the name of the firm that experienced
the operational loss, the parent firm, loss amount, the country where the loss occurred, the
country where the firm has its headquarters, the event risk level and category, key dates of the
loss event, etc. The screening and integrating procedure resulted in a sample of 8,008
observations which includes 1,744 country pairs (target nation and acquirer nation) and years
from 1996 to 2016 for which we were able to collect data on all of the necessary variables.

Variables and Model Specification
We measure our dependent variable, Deal Withdrawal, at country level. For each acquirer
country and target country, we calculated the Withdrawal Ratio as the ratio of number of
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deals withdrawn in a year to the number of total deals announced in that year. Thus, for each
pair of acquirer nation and target nation, there is a different withdrawn ratio for each year.
Our independent variables include the acquirer country’s and the target country’s operational
loss severity (Acquirer OPR and Target OPR), acquirer’s and target’s country governance
(Acquirer Governance and Target Governance). A country’s average operational loss
severity is measured as the ratio of its total severity in a year to its frequency of operational
loss events occurred in that year (Li & Moosa, 2015). We take the logarithm of the average
operational loss severity as our measure. Operational loss frequency is the number of
operational loss events happened in that country in a year while the total operational loss
severity is the total loss amount of all operational loss events occurred in that country in that
year. In addition, Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi (2011) measure country governance quality
using World Governance Indicators (published by the World Bank) on control of corruption,
government effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law, and voice and
accountability. Following Ellis et al. (2017), we measure Acquirer Governance and Target
Governance as the average score on all six dimensions for each acquirer nation and target
nation.
In addition, even though the panel data method is supposed to consider the
unobserved heterogeneity by the method itself, we controlled for two other country-level
effects such as acquirer’s and target’s economy sizes (i.e., annual GDP) from the World Bank
(Acquirer GDP and Target GDP), and acquirer’s and target’s cultural values (Acquirer
Cultural Values and Target Cultural Values) according to Hofstede’s dimensions (Hofstede,
2001).
Then we specify our analysis model at country level with acquirer country’s and
target country’s governance quality and average operational loss severity for each year. Thus,
our model is characterized to be analyzed via panel data method with the varying observation
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as each country-pair (target nation and acquirer nation) and with the variant time as year.
Panel data method allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity, and thus to get
consistent estimates. It further enables us to study the dynamics of the relationship between
country governance quality, long-lasting operational risk and international M&As’ closing
risk. Specifically, we use the following model to analyze our panel data.

Withdrawal Ratio it = β0 + β1 (Acquirer GDP) + β2 (Target GDP) +
β3 (Acquirer Cultural Values) +
β4 (Target Cultural Values) +
β5 (Acquirer Governance) it+ β6 (Target Governance) it +
β7 (Acquirer OPR) it + β8 (Target OPR) it +
β9 (Acquirer Governance * Target Governance) it +
β10 (Acquirer Governance * Acquirer OPR) it +
β11 (Acquirer Governance * Target OPR) it + αi + λt + εit

(1)

where, i indicates every country pair during year t (t = 1996, 1997, …, 2016). αi is
unobserved country effect, λt is unobserved time effect and εit is the idiosyncratic error.

Panel data method includes the fixed effect model, random effect model, and
population-averaged model. Fixed effect method allows the unobserved heterogeneity to be
correlated arbitrarily with the independent variables in the model while random effect method
assumes that the unobserved country effect (αi) is purely random (Wooldridge, 2010).
Differing from the fixed and random effect methods, population-averaged model estimates
the coefficient on averaging across the whole population rather than for the typical individual
or group subject (i.e., country pair). Based on the nature of our research questions and data,
the international deals occurred within one country pair (e.g., United States and China) might
be correlated, thus violating the independence assumptions of the traditional regression
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models (Hubbard et al., 2010). Population-averaged model, using the generalized estimating
equations, estimates the effect by averaging the country-pair specific model across all country
pairs. Furthermore, population-averaged model does not fully specify the distribution of the
population while the cluster-specific model (i.e., fixed and/or random effect models) does
require a fully, jointly, and correctly specified distribution (Neuhaus, 1992; Neuhaus,
Kalbfleisch, & Hauck, 1991). Given the proved robustness and usefulness (Hubbard, et al.,
2010), we used population-averaged model to analyze our panel data and address our
research questions.

Descriptive Statistics
Table 7 shows the distribution of the sample by various groups. Panel A presents the sample
distribution across acquirer nations while panel B shows the sample distribution by target
nations. Over years of 1996 to 2016, the top five acquiring nations are the United States (US,
total 6,720 outbound deals), United Kingdom (total 4,216 outbound deals), Canada (total
2,967 outbound deals), Hong Kong (total 2,677 outbound deals), and Japan (total 1,532
outbound deals). In the meantime, the top five targeted nations are the United States (total
5,774 inbound deals), China (total 3,216 inbound deals), United Kingdom (total 2,673
inbound deals), Canada (total 2,207 inbound deals), and Australia (total 2,111 inbound deals).
As the table shows, highly withdrawn countries are not necessarily those most acquiring or
targeted countries. Thus, we calculated the ratio of withdrawal as the dependent variable
which takes into account the deal volume. One outstanding note to point out is that the United
States has much less operational risk severity comparing to other countries such as Germany,
Spain, and Italy etc. Panel C presents the sample distribution by year. Year 2007 has the most
deals announcements as 3,173 in total) while year 1996 has the least as 678 in total.
Meanwhile, year 2016 has the highest withdrawal ratio as 29.39% while year 1998 has the
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lowest as 12.48%. Panel D lists the top twenty pairs of target nation and acquirer nation. Our
sample has the most international M&As initiated between country pairs such as the US and
Canada, the US and UK, the US and Australia. Among the top twenty country pairs, most
withdrawals occurred between mainland China and Hong Kong, and China (as target nation)
and Singapore (as acquirer nation). However, the most popular country pairs for international
M&As are not necessarily the most failed at the pre-completion stage, which will be shown
clearly combining with the simple statistics.

-------Insert Table 7 here-------

Table 8 reports the descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations among all variables.
The table shows that none of the pairwise correlations is very high, which means the existing
probability of multicollinearity issue is presumably low. Furthermore, the pairwise
correlations tell us that all four independent variables have negative correlations with the
Withdrawn Ratio (even Target OPR’s correlation is insignificant but negative). It is
interesting to see that Target Governance has a relatively higher negative correlation with the
Withdrawal Ratio (-0.0771***) than the Acquirer Governance does (-0.0563***). Thus,
better governance quality from both acquirer and target is seemingly more important to close
the international M&A deal than the institutional distance between acquirer and target
country governance. The positive correlations among Acquirer Governance and Target
Governance (0.0304***), Acquirer OPR and Target OPR (0.0116), Target Governance and
Acquirer OPR (0.0407***) simply and partially prove the co-evolution among countries
through internationalization (Cantwell, Dunning, & Lundan, 2010) and the portability of
acquirer’s governance and principles (Bris et al., 2008; Ellis et al., 2017). In addition, we
reckon that our dependent variable, Withdrawal Ratio, has a relatively small mean and many
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zeros, which does not provide as an ideal level of variance for our analysis as in other studies
like Dikova et al. (2010) and He and Zhang (2018). However, we calculated our Withdrawal
Ratio at country and also year level in comparison with other studies using aggregated
measures of all years.

-------Insert Table 8 here-------

RESULTS
The results of the population-averaged panel data model are presented in Table 9. Unlike
many studies, we do not provide a separate model of only main effects of independent
variables. It is inappropriate and biased estimating and concluding the unconditional (main)
effect in a separate model if the interaction terms are significant in another model (Brambor,
Clark, & Golder, 2006; Carte & Russell, 2003; Dawson, 2014). Thus, we test our main
effects and moderation effects together in our one model presented in Table 9. It is
interesting to see that neither of the acquirer’s country GDP (β1 = 0, p > 0.1)) nor the target’s
country GDP (β2 = 0, p > 0.1) has a significant effect on the country-pair’s pre-deal failure
rate. While the acquirer’s national culture has no significant effect (β3 = -0.0005, p > 0.1), the
target’s national culture has a negative effect on the closing risk (β4 = -0.0011, p < 0.01).
When other variables (i.e., Target Governance, Acquirer OPR, and Target OPR) are at zero,
Acquirer Governance decreases the deal’s Withdrawn Ratio significantly (β5 = -0.0204, p <
0.01). Thus, our hypothesis 1 is supported. Target Governance also decreases the Withdrawn
Ratio significantly (β6 = -0.0281, p < 0.01) if other conditions are absent. Acquirer’s
operational risk severity decreases the pre-deal failure rate significantly (β7 = -0.0107, p <
0.010), and the target’s operational risk severity does not have a direct or significant marginal
effect on the closing risk (β8 = -0.0034, p > 0.1) when other conditions are absent. Simply
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from the coefficients of interaction terms in Table 9, we can see that the interactions between
Acquirer Governance and Target Governance (β9 = -0.0205, p < 0.01), Acquirer Governance
and Acquirer OPR (β10 = -0.0072, p < 0.05), and interactions between Acquirer Governance
and Target OPR (β11 = 0.0072, p < 0.05) are significant. However, we cannot conclude with
full confidence that our hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 are supported. Established studies have shown
that the coefficients of interaction terms do not tell us the full and precise story of the
moderating effects (Kinsley, Noordewier, & Vanden Bergh, 2017; Spiller, Fitzsimons,
Lynch, & McClelland, 2013). Following the recommendations from these studies, we
conducted a series of comprehensive tests for the moderating effects shown in Figure 4A—
6B.

-------Insert Table 9 here-------

The results in Table 9 tells us that Acquirer Governance decreases Withdrawn Ratio
when other conditions are absent (β5 = -0.0204, p < 0.01, which is impossible in real
practices) and even decreases Withdrawal Ratio more when Target Governance is present (
β9 = -0.0205, p < 0.01; -0. 0204-0. 0205= -0.0409). In order to avoid the issue of overstating
the moderating effect, we tested the marginal effect of Acquirer Governance at various values
of Target Governance (Kingsley et al., 2017). Figure 4A plots the marginal effect along with
the 95% confidence bands over the relevant values of the moderating variable Target
Governance, which shows that Acquirer Governance has a statistically significant and
negative effect on the Withdrawn Ratio over most of the sample values of Target Governance
(from roughly -0.6 to 1) rather than all of the sample values. Figure 4B further vividly
demonstrates the slope difference when Target Governance is low vs. high. When Target
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Governance is low, Acquirer Governance increases the Withdrawn Ratio while only
decreases when Target Governance is high.

--------Insert Figure 4A and 4B here--------

Table 9 shows that Acquirer Governance decreases Withdrawal Ratio more when
Acquirer OPR is present (β10 = -0.0072, p < 0.05; -0. 0204- 0. 0072= -0.0276). Again, we plot
the marginal effect over the relevant values of the Acquirer OPR in Figure 5A and present
that Acquirer Governance decreases Withdrawal Ratio only over some sample values of
Acquirer OPR (from -1 to 4). Thus, we can conclude that, although the coefficient of the
interaction between Acquirer Governance and Acquirer OPR is significant, Acquirer
Governance only decreases the deals’ closing risk when the acquirer is from a country with
high operational risk and actually increases the deals’ closing risk if the acquirer is from a
country with low operational risk as also shown in Figure 5B interaction plot.

--------Insert Figure 5A and 5B here--------

Acquirer Governance decreases the Withdrawal Ratio less when Target OPR is
present (β11 = 0.0072, p < 0.05; -0. 0204 + 0. 0072= -0.0132) than absent (β5 = -0.0204, p <
0.01) from Table 9. In other words, Target OPR weakens the risk mitigation effect of
Acquirer Governance on the deal completion. However, not all levels of Target OPR will
weaken the negative effect of Acquirer Governance. The conclusion from Table 9 would be
plainly biased. Figure 6A proves that Acquirer Governance’s negative effect on Withdrawal
Ratio will be smaller only when the Target OPR is lower than 1 versus higher than 1. Figure
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6B further demonstrates that Acquirer Governance will only decrease the probability of deal
withdrawal when Target OPR is low rather than high.

--------Insert Figure 6A and 6B here--------

ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
We mainly conducted two types of robustness checks. First, we tested the model with an
alternative dependent variable with a different method. The alternative dependent variable
used here is the deal-level withdrawal or completion as the dependent variable instead of the
aggregated country-level withdrawn ratio. With this deal-level dependent variable, we chose
to use the multilevel method (MLM) for the analysis. Second, we use an alternative measure
of acquirer’s and target’s country governance.
Using the deal-level withdrawal (Deal Withdrawal) as the dependent variable, we
tested the model with the mixed multilevel method. The sample size remains the same, with
8,008 observations within 1,744 country pairs. As Table 10 shows, the main effects are quite
similar and even more significant. The only difference in the set of main effects is that the
Acquirer Cultural Values shows a negative and significant effect on the Deal Withdrawal (β3
= -0.0008, p < 0.1). The coefficients of the interaction terms Acquirer Governance and
Target Governance (β9 = -0.0118, p > 0.1), and Acquirer Governance and Acquirer OPR (β10
= -0.0066, p > 0.1) are insignificant in this mixed multilevel model, while the coefficient of
the interaction term Acquirer Governance and Target OPR (β9 = 0.0075, p < 0.05) is still
positive and significant. Again, we plotted the marginal effects to show a more
comprehensive picture of the interaction effects in Figure 7, 8, & 9. Figures 7—9 present that
H2, 3, & 4 are supported partially as the population-averaged model proves in previous
section.
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--------Insert Table 10, Figure 7, Figure 8, and Figure 9 here--------

Instead of the six dimensions from the World Governance Indicators we employ
scores from the Fraser Institute’s World Economic Freedom Index (Aybar & Ficici, 2009;
North, 1990; Zhou et al., 2016). The index (EFI) is a scalar variable ranging from 1 (low
level of institutional development) to 10 (high level of institutional development). The
resulting sample size using EFI become to 7,852 international deals within 1,709 country
pairs from 2000 to 2016. The results in Table 11 are quite similar to our original results using
the WGI. Using EFI, the direct effect of Acquirer Governance while other conditions are
absent is not significant (β5 = -0.0095, p > 0.1), which is not practically useful or meaningful
even if it is significant. The coefficients of the interaction terms between Acquirer
Governance and Target Governance (β9 = -0.0103, p > 0.1), Acquirer Governance and
Target OPR (β11 = 0.0050, p > 0.1) are insignificant in this model using EFI. Thus, we
conducted more tests of marginal effects shown in Figure 10, 11, and 12. The marginal plots
show that our H2, 3, & 4 are still supported partially at the right direction, but with a smaller
range of values. After the two alternative tests, we are confident that our conclusions and
findings are robust and consistent.

--------Insert Table 11, Figure 10, Figure 11, and Figure 12 here--------

DISCUSSION
The main culprit of deal abandonment is information asymmetry. In international M&As, the
effect of information asymmetry is elevated because of “liability of foreignness” (i.e.,
institutional distance and other country-level differences). Through this article, we explore
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the reasons of elevated information asymmetry in the lens of institutional environment (or,
country governance quality) contingent on operational risk. We extend the information
asymmetry argument by combining the institutional theory and finance’s contribution on
operational risk. Institutional theory provides “rules of the game” while operational risk
shows the players’ actions.
Instead of testing the effect of institutional distance, we decompose and investigate
the direct effect of acquiring country’s governance quality and its contingency on selling
country’s governance quality. Scholars have focused and found that institutional distance
decreases the likelihood of deal completion, however, we believe we should carefully check
the effect of acquirer’s and target’s institutional environment separately rather than using
difference approach. Our study finds that acquirer’s country governance quality increases the
chance of deal completion without considering the target’s country governance quality.
Furthermore, when the target’s country governance quality is high, the acquirer increases its
likelihood of deal completion even more, and increases less when the target is from a less
developed institution. This finding tells us that institutional distance does not always
decreases the deal closing risk. Such scenario as high acquiring country governance and low
target country governance (i.e., high institutional distance) would increase the deal closing
risk.
A firm’s country governance quality provides us the information on the local
regulations and societal values that the firm is supposed to be following. However, firms are
semi-autonomous, and they act on the basis of their own interpretations and incentives
(Astley & Van De Ven, 1983). Thus, we investigate the players’ actions through their
realized operational losses.
First, we find that the deal is less likely to withdrawal when the acquirer is from a
country characterized with better institutional environment and higher operational risk. The

- 77 -

acquirer country’s level of operational risk helps the acquirer learn to choose and evaluate the
target better. When the acquirer is from a country not only with high governance quality but
also high operational risk, it boosts its organizational learning from other firms’ or their
operational loss events, which could be transferred to target selection and evaluation in
acquisitions (Barkema & Schijven, 2008). Under such a scenario, the acquirer conducts a
more thorough assessment on the target’s value, strategic compatibility, and accounting and
finance information, which eventually helps them avoid bearing upfront costs and
abandoning the deal.
Second, we find that the deal is more likely to complete when the acquirer is under a
strong governance system and the target’s country has low operational risk. If the target’s
country has high operational risk, the target is more likely to hide or fabricate its negative
information, creating high information asymmetry with the acquirer and obstacles for the
acquirer to execute an accurate assessment during private takeover process. In addition, with
a high operational risk business environment, the acquirer’s shareholders will be more likely
to react negatively and push the acquirer to withdrawal the deal.
Our study contributes to the information asymmetry theory by reckoning the effect of
organizational behaviors (i.e., operational losses in our context) under various “rules of the
game”. Institutional theory explains part of information asymmetry with respect of the
differences in organizational principles, regulations, shared values, and societal norms.
However, these rules do not fully predict individual behaviors or employment practices. By
connecting to the realized activities, operational risk informs us the players’ actions under
various “rules of the game”, which together helps the acquirers select and evaluate targets
and make strategic decisions.
One limitation of our study is that we focus on country-level factors rather than multilevel sources of explanations on deal abandonment. Despite that the nature of our study
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allows us to exploit the dynamics of international M&As with only country-level factors in a
long-term window, we could comprehensively examine the influence of multi-level factors
including the deal-level characteristics. In order to keep the data format and analysis as panel,
we calculate our dependent variable, withdrawal ratio, at country level varying throughout
years. Such measurement limits the variance to be explain at deal level, thus relatively
preventing us from multi-level analysis. If we use the deal completion at the deal level, the
dependent variable would not vary with time, at least would not vary at the same level as the
country-level variables, which could shift the theoretical focus of our study.
Our study opens several important avenues for future research by introducing
operational risk from finance to international business. After decades of research in IB using
cultural distance and institutional distance, we need another country-level variable which is
explanatory, complementary, and dynamic. While cultural and institutional studies provide us
the variance in regulations and shared values across countries (Hofstede, 1984; Kogut &
Singh, 1988; North, 1990; Scott, 1995), operational risk measures the execution and delivery
of firm strategies and organizational behaviors under rules of the society. Operational risk has
gained more importance because of the development of technology, growth of e-commerce,
large-scale M&As, and globalization. Along with the methodological advance and data
boom, operational risk could provide us a better tool to quantify and predict country-level
uncertainty along with other such country risk dimensions as political risk, financial risk, and
economic risk (Howell, 2011), thus studying the corresponding firm-level strategy.
We recommend two major future research directions building on operational risk.
First, we can study the effect of operational risk on firm divestment decisions after
international M&As. While deal withdrawal represents the M&A failure at pre-completion
phase, divestiture could be an indicator of M&A failure after the completion. For postcompletion success, people-side integration and management are the key determinant (Shea
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& Solomon, 2013). While cultural distance helps us understand the difference of people’s
values and attitudes, operational risk measures people’s conducted behavior and actions.
Thus, operational risk could explain part of the integration failure in international M&As.
Second, operational loss events could help us understand the co-evolution between
MNEs in the local country and local country’s governance development. As the argument of
isomorphism gets challenged, the co-evolution theorists investigate how MNEs shift the local
economy by enforcing their unique, foreign differences (Cantwell et al., 2010; Kostova et al.,
2008). Well-documented operational loss events could inform us the mistakes made by the
local subsidiaries, which guides us to learn the influence of MNEs on the evolution of local
country governance. In other words, through the lens of operational risk, we could observe
how actors exercise judgement, adapt to the local rules, and transform the local system.
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APPENDIX---TABLES

Table 1: Sample Distribution
Panel A: Sample Distribution by Target Nation
Target Nation
United Kingdom
Canada
Germany
France
Australia
China
Netherlands
Israel
India
Sweden
Switzerland
Brazil
Japan
South Korea
Spain
Italy
Mexico
Norway
Denmark
Ireland-Rep
Other
Total - Grand Mean

N
369
298
152
109
102
73
62
58
52
45
44
41
40
39
34
33
32
31
26
25
228
1,893

Cultural
Distance
3.22
3.76
7.82
14.02
1.39
20.79
12.44
14.89
14.34
15.85
6.95
17.17
18.42
22.05
15.59
8.77
20.54
14.78
14.62
6.81
16.72
9.87

Institutional
Distance
0.16
0.31
0.18
-0.07
0.30
-1.81
0.41
-0.73
-1.54
0.47
0.46
-1.30
-0.18
-0.59
-0.33
-0.66
-1.39
0.44
0.52
0.22
-0.53
-0.12

Mean
Δ Risk
0.16***
0.24***
0.17***
0.12**
0.15**
0.23**
0.12*
0.24**
0.37***
0.08
0.08
0.07
0.15
0.17**
0.13
0.24**
0.18
0.08
0.11
0.30**
0.20***
0.18***
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Panel B: Sample Distribution by Acquirer’s Industry
Acquirer's Industry
Business Services
Electronic Equipment
Machinery
Computers
Medical Equipment
Measuring and Control Equipment
Trading
Pharmaceutical Products
Chemicals
Wholesale
Petroleum and Natural Gas
Electrical Equipment
Retail
Automobiles and Trucks
Consumer Goods
Construction Materials
Steel Works etc
Communication
Banking
Precious Metals
Others
Total - Grand Mean

Panel C: Sample Distribution by Year
Total Value
Year
N
($mil)
2000
205
41,385.20
2002
124
18,111.58
2003
119
35,985.33
2004
163
21,816.90
2005
171
33,420.07
2006
165
32,895.01
2007
164
46,841.33
2008
141
36,315.04
2009
88
24,018.80
2010
122
31,255.21
2011
140
43,816.64
2012
140
48,374.15
2013
121
29,108.87
2014
30
6,048.86
Total - Grand Mean 1,893
449,392.99
***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

% Related Mean
Target
Δ Risk
398
41.0%
0.20***
223
39.9%
0.09***
124
21.8%
0.21***
104
9.6%
0.10**
92
28.3%
0.02
88
12.5%
0.09*
87
11.5%
0.40***
71
50.7%
0.34***
68
27.9%
0.10
49
22.4%
0.15*
46
54.3%
0.17*
43
14.0%
0.11
43
27.9%
0.12
37
45.9%
0.26**
34
32.4%
0.17*
30
10.0%
0.26**
28
21.4%
0.23
28
25.0%
0.39***
26
0.0%
0.11
25
64.0%
0.17
249
37.8%
0.21***
1,893
31.6%
0.18***
N

Median
Value
44.06
30.00
28.00
38.80
32.67
48.41
27.15
36.80
35.04
71.43
57.95
59.72
72.00
73.92
41.70

Mean
Δ Risk
0.33***
0.35***
-0.02
0.01
0.02
0.06
0.38***
0.64***
-0.30***
0.03
0.61***
-0.15***
0.10**
0.29***
0.18***
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix
Panel A: Pairwise Correlations
Model Variables
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
1.00
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1. Δ Risk
-0.29***1.00
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
2. Risk (T-120, T-1)
0.59*** -0.17***1.00
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
3. Δ VIX Index (T0, T120)
-0.12***1.00 .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
4. Δ AAII Sentiment (T0, T120) -0.11***0.03
-0.04* -0.21***0.05** -0.02 1.00
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
5. Merger Wave Dummy
0.01
0.24*** 0.04* 0.10***-0.38***1.00 .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
6. Recession Dummy
0.01
-0.04
0.01
0.04 0.01
-0.01 1.00
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
7. % Paid in Cash
-0.05** -0.03
-0.08***0.04* 0.02
-0.04* 0.02
1.00
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
8. Price/Book Ratio
0.08*** -0.12***0.05** -0.03 0.02
-0.01 0.11*** 0.12*** 1.00
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
9. Total Debt/Total Assets
0.04* 0.01
-0.02
0.00 -0.03
0.00 -0.18***-0.10***0.04
1.00
.
.
.
.
.
.
10. Relative Deal Size
-0.02
0.00
0.00
0.06** -0.02
-0.01 -0.11***0.02
-0.18***0.13*** 1.00
.
.
.
.
.
11. % of Shares Acquired
0.01
0.05** -0.01 0.00
0.10***0.08*** -0.08***0.26*** -0.12***-0.20***1.00
.
.
.
.
12. Prior Acquisition Experience0.01
0.01
0.00
-0.03
0.06***-0.04* 0.05** -0.08***0.08*** -0.06***0.01
-0.01
-0.08***1.00 .
.
.
13. Industry Relatedness
0.00
0.00
0.01
-0.02 0.00
0.02 0.03
0.04
0.10*** -0.08***-0.25***0.15*** 0.04 1.00
.
.
14. Cultural Distance
0.02
-0.06**
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.01
0.00
0.12***
-0.08***
-0.24***
0.11***
0.06**
0.59***
1.00
.
15. Absolute Inst. Distance
-0.02
0.01
-0.02
0.02 -0.04* 0.01 -0.02
-0.03 -0.15***0.11*** 0.26*** -0.14***-0.02 -0.74***-0.62*** 1.00
16. Upstream / Downstream
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics
Model Variables
Mean
5th Percentile
Median
95th Percentile
SD
N

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

0.180
-0.534
0.035
1.496
0.622
1,893

0.228
0.076
0.192
0.494
0.141
1,893

0.331
-8.391
-0.575
11.599
6.621
1,893

-0.005
-0.137
-0.002
0.118
0.078
1,893

0.750
0.000
1.000
1.000
0.433
1,893

0.185
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.389
1,893

93.322
47.945
100.000
100.000
18.268
1,893

3.126
0.732
2.309
7.888
3.176
1,893

0.496
0.151
0.490
0.900
0.215
1,893

0.079
0.000
0.022
0.322
0.184
1,893

86.497
10.522
100.00
100.00
28.370
1,893

2.269
0.000
1.000
9.000
4.845
1,893

0.316
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.465
1,893

9.870
1.392
7.818
22.050
6.711
1,893

0.481
0.054
0.321
1.744
0.497
1,893

0.671
0.000
1.000
1.000
0.470
1,893

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 3 Multivariate Regression Analysis

Industry Relatedness (IR)

(H1)

(1)
Base Model
0.481***
(7.582)
-0.941***
(-6.293)
0.052***
(16.619)
-0.357***
(-3.970)
-0.165***
(-3.122)
0.003
(0.099)
0.000
(0.430)
-0.001
(-0.190)
0.071
(1.094)
0.188*
(1.788)
-0.001
(-1.053)
-0.003*
(-1.820)
.

Cultural Distance (CD)

(H2)

.

Inst. Distance Downstream (IDD)

(H3)

.

Inst. Distance Upstream (IDU)

(H4)

.

IR  CD

(H5)

.

0.000
(-0.387)
-0.002
(-0.427)
0.020
(0.359)
0.153
(1.439)
0.000
(-0.450)
0.001
(0.598)
0.050***
(3.130)
-0.001
(-0.468)
-0.008
(-0.326)
-0.046
(-0.649)
.

IR  IDD

(H6)

.

.

0.000
(-0.516)
-0.002
(-0.595)
0.022
(0.406)
0.151
(1.432)
0.000
(-0.427)
0.001
(0.489)
0.051***
(3.233)
0.003
(1.355)
-0.004
(-0.177)
-0.062
(-0.841)
-0.010***
(-4.295)
.

IR  IDU

(H7)

.

.

.

CD  IDD

(H8)

.

.

.

DV: ΔRisk
Constant
Risk (T-120, T-1)
Δ VIX
Δ Sentiment
Merger Wave Dummy
Recession Dummy
% Paid in Cash
Price/Book Ratio
Total Debt/Total Assets
Relative Deal Size
% of Shares Acquired
Prior M&A Experience

(2)
Main Effects
0.478***
(6.534)
-1.313***
(-10.738)
0.051***
(16.313)
-0.295***
(-3.339)
.

(3)
IR  CD
0.487***
(6.990)
-1.326***
(-10.667)
0.051***
(16.277)
-0.288***
(-3.146)
.

(4)
IR  ID
0.473***
(6.582)
-1.316***
(-10.870)
0.051***
(16.157)
-0.297***
(-3.240)
.

(5)
CD  ID
0.478***
(6.522)
-1.317***
(-10.511)
0.051***
(16.430)
-0.293***
(-3.308)
.

.

.

.

.

0.000
(-0.357)
-0.002
(-0.571)
0.020
(0.353)
0.155
(1.443)
0.000
(-0.362)
0.001
(0.576)
0.054***
(3.653)
-0.001
(-0.371)
0.050
(1.568)
0.087
(1.165)
.

0.000
(-0.345)
-0.001
(-0.324)
0.017
(0.285)
0.155
(1.459)
0.000
(-0.358)
0.001
(0.723)
0.047**
(2.830)
-0.001
(-0.443)
0.026
(0.433)
-0.066
(-0.944)
.

-0.177***
(-2.998)
-0.401**
(-2.401)
.

.
.

-0.004
(-0.522)
CD  IDU
(H9)
.
.
.
.
-0.041*
(-2.050)
Year Fixed Effects
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
1,893
1,893
1,893
1,893
1,893
R-squared
0.408
0.452
0.454
0.455
0.453
Adj. R-squared
0.404
0.447
0.449
0.450
0.448
Mean VIF
1.116
1.174
1.230
1.269
1.801
This table presents OLS regression results of the effects of Industry Relatedness (IR), Cultural Distance (CD), and Institutional
Distance (ID) on Systematic Risk Changes (∆Risk) surrounding cross-border M&As. The t statistics based on robust standard
errors clustered by industry are reported in brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4 Robustness Tests
DV: ΔRisk; ID: EFI
DV: Δ Altman Z-Score
Sample: Serial acquirers
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
IRCD
IRID
CDID
IRCD
IRID
CDID
IRCD
IRID
CDID
Constant
0.092***
0.090***
0.096***
-1.269***
-1.188***
-1.256***
0.521***
0.500***
0.512***
IR
(H1)
0.004
0.003
0.005
-0.092
-0.007
-0.094
0.031
0.028
0.020
CD
(H2)
0.000
0.000
-0.001**
-0.004
0.001
-0.001
0.002
-0.001
-0.001
IDD
(H3)
0.007
0.017**
0.020***
0.214*
0.021
-0.133
0.025
0.084**
0.027
IDU
(H4)
0.012
0.014
-0.021
-0.535**
-0.652*
-0.545**
0.053
0.169
0.054
IRCD
(H5)
-0.002**
.
.
0.015*
.
.
-0.010***
.
.
IR IDD
(H6)
.
-0.031***
.
.
0.511*
.
.
-0.215***
.
IR IDU
(H7)
.
-0.015
.
.
1.718***
.
.
-0.304
.
CD  IDD
(H8)
.
.
-0.001**
.
.
0.045*
.
.
0.000
CD  IDU
(H9)
.
.
-0.009***
.
.
-0.022
.
.
-0.040***
Controls: Base Model









Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
1,893
1,893
1,893
1,535
1,535
1,535
1,099
1,099
1,099
Adj. R-squared
0.533
0.534
0.533
0.126
0.075
0.126
0.488
0.489
0.486
Mean VIF
1.337
1.403
1.860
1.254
1.298
1.811
1.289
1.320
1.815
Sample: Excl. Financials
Sample: Excl. United Kingdom
Sample: Excl. Canada
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
IRCD
IRID
CDID
IRCD
IRID
CDID
IRCD
IRID
CDID
Constant
0.475***
0.459***
0.463***
0.515***
0.505***
0.500***
0.454***
0.439***
0.450***
IR
(H1)
0.055***
0.057***
0.051***
0.024
0.018
0.012
0.060***
0.043***
0.041**
CD
(H2)
0.004**
0.000
0.000
0.000
-0.002
-0.001
0.005*
0.001
0.000
IDD
(H3)
-0.008
0.050
0.037
-0.001
0.053
0.021
-0.010
0.044
0.016
IDU
(H4)
-0.071
0.056
-0.070
-0.124
-0.085
-0.052
-0.119
0.047
-0.091
IRCD
(H5)
-0.011***
.
.
-0.006**
.
.
-0.011***
.
.
IR IDD
(H6)
.
-0.180**
.
.
-0.172***
.
.
-0.179**
.
IR IDU
(H7)
.
-0.325*
.
.
-0.087
.
.
-0.462**
.
CD  IDD
(H8)
.
.
-0.006
.
.
-0.003
.
.
-0.003
CD  IDU
(H9)
.
.
-0.035*
.
.
-0.044**
.
.
-0.037*









Controls: Base Model
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
1,771
1,771
1,771
1,524
1,524
1,524
1,595
1,595
1,595
Adj. R-squared
0.447
0.447
0.445
0.435
0.437
0.435
0.462
0.463
0.459
Mean VIF
1.221
1.266
1.766
1.243
1.281
1.821
1.244
1.278
1.819
This table presents OLS regression results of the effects of Industry Relatedness (IR), Cultural Distance (CD) and Downstream - Upstream Institutional Distance (IDD - IDU) on acquirer
systematic risk changes around cross-border M&As. Robust standard errors (not reported) were clustered by industry. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5 Managerial Relevance of Empirical Results
Panel A: Risk Implications of Empirical Results
Scenario

Industry
Relatedness (IR)
High
High
Low
Low
·
·
High
High
Low
Low
·
·

#1
#2
#3
Risk-Mitigating
Scenarios
#4
#5
#6
#7
#8
Risk-Increasing
#9
Scenarios
#10
#11
#12
Panel B: Illustrative Example Scenarios
Acquirer Industry:
Pre-packaged Software
Acquirer SIC:
7372
Acquirer Nation:
USA
Scenario
Target Industry
#1
Pre-packaged Software
#2
Pre-packaged Software
Risk-Mitigating
#3
Computer Peripheral Equipment
Scenarios
#4
Computer Peripheral Equipment
#5
·
#6
·
#7
Pre-packaged Software
#8
Pre-packaged Software
Risk-Increasing
#9
Computer Peripheral Equipment
Scenarios
#10
Computer Peripheral Equipment
#11
·
#12
·

Cultural
Distance (CD)
High
·
Low
·
High
Low
Low
·
High
·
High
Low

Target Nation
South Korea
China
Canada
Belgium
Indonesia
United Kingdom
Canada
Belgium
South Korea
China
Portugal
South Africa

Institutional
Distance (ID)
·
High
·
Low
High
Low
·
Low
·
High
Low
High

SIC
7372
7372
3577
3577
·
·
7372
7372
3577
3577
·
·

CD
22.05
·
3.76
·
21.84
3.22
3.76
·
22.05
·
22.90
6.92

ID
·
-1.806
·
0.029
-2.267
0.158
·
0.029
·
-1.806
-0.128
-1.007
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Table 6 Classification of Operational Loss Events According to the BCBS
Event-Type
Category
(Level 1)

Internal
Fraud

External
Fraud

Definition

Categories
(Level 2)

Activity Examples (Level 3)

Unauthorized
activity

Conducting unauthorized
transaction;
Mismarking of position
(intentional);

Theft and Fraud

Theft / extortion /
embezzlement/ robbery;
Misappropriation of assets;
Account take-over;
Tax non-compliance;
Bribes / kickback;
Insider trading (not on firm’s
account);

Theft and Fraud

Theft / robbery;
Forgery;
Check kiting;

Systems
Security

Hacking damage;
Theft of information;

Losses due to acts of fraud
involving at least one
internal party

Losses due to acts of fraud
involving a third party

Incident Examples from global data
In May 1998, Kia Motors Corp, a South Korean
automobile manufacturing firm, reported that it
had realized a loss of $37M due to
embezzlement committed by its former
chairman, Kim Sun-hong. Kim was accused of
embezzling the funds between 1994 and 1997
and using them to purchase Kia stocks in order
to defend his managerial control. An
investigation revealed that Kim had used
company funds to bribe and lobby politicians in
order to obtain bank loans to keep the company
afloat. He was arrested in the course of a
government inquiry conducted in the wake of
the financial crisis.
In May 2006, Mitsubishi UFJ Trust and
Banking Corp, a financial institution and
subsidiary of Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group
Inc, reported that it lost approximately $20.11M
(2.24B JPY) in pension assets for corporate
clients due to financial statement falsifications
made by Seibu Railway Corp.
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Employment
Practices
and
Workplace
Safety

Clients,
Products,
and
Business
Practices

Losses arising from acts
inconsistent with
employment, health or
safety laws or agreements,
from payment of personal
injury claims, or from
diversity / discrimination
events

Losses arising from an
unintentional or negligent
failure to meet a
professional obligation to
specific clines or from the
nature or design of a
product

Employee
Relations

Compensation, benefit,
termination issues;
Organized labor activity;

Safe
Environment

General liability;
Employee health and safety
rules;
Workers compensation;

Diversity and
Discrimination

All discrimination types

Suitability,
Disclosure, and
Fiduciary

Improper
Business or
Market Practices
Product Flaws

Fiduciary breaches /
guidelines violations;
Suitability / disclosure
issues;
Retail customer disclosure
violations;
Breach of privacy;
Aggressive sales;
Account churning;
Misuse of confidential
information;
Antitrust;
Improper trade / market
practices;
Unlicensed activity;
Product defects;

In August 2015, Target Corp, a US retail
company, reported that it would pay $2.8M to
the US Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) to settle allegations of
hiring discrimination. The EEOC's investigation
found that Target used three employment
assessments during its hiring process that
disproportionately eliminated applicants for
exempt-level professional jobs based on race
and sex. The assessments were not based on
business necessity or sufficiently job-related, so
they violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The
company also required applicants to undergo an
assessment by a psychologist during the hiring
process. The Americans with Disabilities Act
prohibited employers from requiring job
applicants to submit to medical examinations
before they were offered employment.
In April 2017, Hertz Corp, a US vehicle rental
company and subsidiary of Hertz Global
Holdings Inc, reported that two subsidiaries
were fined $.93M (1.25M CAD) by Canada's
Competition Bureau for misleading advertising.
Beginning in 2009, Hertz Canada Ltd and
Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group Canada Inc
(Dollar Thrifty Canada) advertised car rental
prices in Canada on their websites, mobile
applications, emails, and promotional materials.
However, those prices did not include certain
mandatory fees that increased the advertised
prices by up to 57 percent. Furthermore, the
companies advertised discounts that could not
be applied to the mandatory fees. As a result,
the companies advertised prices that were not
- 103 -

Model errors;

Damage
Physical
Assets

Losses arising from
to
damage to physical assets
from natural disaster or
other events

Business
Losses arising from
Disruption
disruption of business or
and System
system failure
Failure

Selection,
Sponsorship,
and Exposure

Failure to investigate client
per guidelines

Advisory
Activities

Disputes over performance
of advisory activities

Disaster and
other events

Natural disaster loses;
Human losses from external
sources (terrorism or
vandalism);
Environmental degradation /
hazardous material release;

Systems

Hardware;
Software;
Telecommunications;
Utility outage / disruptions

actually available to consumers. The
Competition Bureau also found that Hertz
Canada and Dollar Thrifty Canada combined
the fees with actual taxes and used descriptions
that made it seem as if governments and
authorized agencies required them to charge the
fees. In reality, the companies used the fees to
reduce their business expenses.
In September 2013, Shell Oil Co, a US oil
company and subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell
PLC, reported that it would pay $1.1M (1.16M
EUR) to the US Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) for violations of the Clean Air
Act. The EPA named two Shell Oil subsidiaries
in its order, Shell Offshore Inc and Shell Gulf of
Mexico Inc. The companies were accused of
violating their Clean Air Act permits issued for
oil and gas exploration drilling in the Chukchi
and Beaufort Seas near the North Slope of
Alaska.
In August 2013, Amazon.com Inc, a US online
retailer, reported that it lost an estimated
$4.72M in sales due to an outage. For about 40
minutes on August 19, 2013, users were unable
to access the retailer's website to manage their
accounts, search for products or pay for
products. A review of the company's web
history indicated that its Amazon Flexible
Payments Service and Amazon Management
Console had increased API error rates.
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Table 7 Sample Distributions

Panel A: Sample Distribution by Acquirer Nation
Acquirer Nation

# of Total Deals

# of Withdrawn Deals

United States
United Kingdom
Canada
Hong Kong
Japan
Singapore
Australia
China
France
Germany
Netherlands
South Korea
Switzerland
Sweden
Spain
Italy
India
Ireland
Malaysia
Belgium
Others
TOTAL

6720
4216
2967
2677
1532
1502
1418
1272
1059
896
825
598
563
540
517
515
503
449
401
297
3,205
32,672

997
563
711
921
357
341
325
427
138
109
105
192
102
65
51
76
112
47
97
35
558
6,329

Operational Risk Severity
($ million)
57.46
1694.90
735.62
3668.85
1118.97
3185.84
406.46
1591.46
4599.71
57411.69
4338.72
971.76
7526.03
2296.02
9986.44
8558.22
796.93
561.43
382.12
3240.24
86,949.91
200,078.79
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Panel B: Sample Distribution by Target Nation
Target Nation

# of Total Deals

# of Withdrawn Deals

United States
China
United Kingdom
Canada
Australia
India
Germany
France
Hong Kong
South Korea
Singapore
Spain
Brazil
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
Indonesia
Russia
Sweden
Switzerland
Others
TOTAL

5774
3216
2673
2207
2111
1224
1206
1137
1134
706
656
639
636
627
578
526
491
457
368
349
5,957
32,672

946
1137
370
413
425
239
158
108
379
167
167
60
84
93
74
65
129
102
36
62
1,115
6,329

Operational Risk Severity
($ million)
41.7081
2449.347
1052.385
545.0497
442.2594
1585.514
61027.23
4032.034
3044.019
1069.199
2866.624
7425.597
3703.808
7598.494
447.2743
2203.309
8238.501
7193.611
1620.078
4826.858
105,053
226,466
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Panel C: Sample Distribution by Year
Year

# of Total
Deals

# of Withdrawn
Deals

Withdrawal Ratio
(%)

1996
1998
2000
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
TOTAL

678
1594
1848
1040
1226
1737
1936
2390
3173
2504
1745
2145
2123
1890
1543
1754
1665
1681
32,672

92
199
296
186
219
340
316
488
608
514
389
429
423
382
314
311
329
494
6,329

13.57%
12.48%
16.02%
17.88%
17.86%
19.57%
16.32%
20.42%
19.16%
20.53%
22.29%
20.00%
19.92%
20.21%
20.35%
17.73%
19.76%
29.39%
19.08% (mean)

Acquirer
Operational Risk
Severity
($ million)
8338.83
14851.23
2973.46
2082.84
16565.16
6909.41
8211.88
8678.77
10016.72
17327.22
4794.95
3086.13
30026.19
3038.76
1917.02
2326.77
2998.49
55934.97
200,078.79

Target
Operational Risk
Severity
($ million)
8253.38
15606.07
4089.27
5120.03
18487.27
11734.79
7739.66
12090.97
20393.02
13214.79
11180.27
3543.85
18401.31
4089.51
1765.48
3110.16
3630.31
64015.41
226,465.54
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Panel D: Sample Distribution by Country Pairs (Target Nation and Acquirer Nation)

Target Nation & Acquirer Nation
United States & Canada
China & Hong Kong
Canada & United States
United States & United Kingdom
United Kingdom & United States
Australia & United States
India & United States
China & United States
Hong Kong & China
Australia & United Kingdom
United States & Australia
United States & Japan
Germany & United States
France & United States
China & Singapore
Germany & United Kingdom
France & United Kingdom
United States & France
Brazil & United States
South Korea & United States
Other pairs
TOTAL

# of
Total
Deals
1728
1659
1279
1199
1082
452
440
425
394
359
358
346
322
306
284
270
259
215
203
201
20,891
32,672

# of
Withdrawn
Deals
350
659
209
98
108
76
72
101
146
66
55
55
26
21
102
39
26
24
20
61
4,015
6,329

Acquirer
Target
Operational Operational
Risk
Risk
Severity
Severity
($ million)
($ million)
20.25%
44.67
1.61
39.72%
217.38
162.12
16.34%
1.61
44.67
8.17%
59.00
1.61
9.98%
1.61
59.00
16.81%
1.61
28.65
16.36%
1.45
127.79
23.76%
1.61
162.12
37.06%
162.12
217.38
18.38%
59.00
28.65
15.36%
28.65
1.61
15.90%
55.24
1.61
8.07%
1.53
4005.88
6.86%
1.61
373.38
35.92%
245.87
132.77
14.44%
53.54
4005.88
10.04%
59.00
373.38
11.16%
373.38
1.61
9.85%
1.30
265.31
30.35%
1.61
103.62
198,706.99
216,366.87
17.98%(mean) 200,078.79
226,465.54

Withdrawal
Ratio
(%)
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Table 8 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix

Panel A: Pairwise Correlations
Model Variables
1. Withdrawal Ratio
2. Acquirer GDP
3. Target GDP
4. Acquirer Cultural Values
5. Target Cultural Values
6. Target Operational Risk
7. Acquirer Operational Risk
8. Acquirer Country Governance
9. Target Country Governance
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics
Model Variables
Mean
5th Percentile
50th Percentile
95th Percentile
Sd
N
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1

1.
1
0.0046
-0.0088
-0.0068
-0.0435***
-0.0177
-0.054***
-0.0563***
-0.0771***

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

1
-0.0853***
0.2499***
-0.0343***
0.0354***
-0.4698***
-0.0055
-0.0143

1
-0.025**
0.1994***
-0.4009***
0.0433**
-0.0554***
0.1258***

1
0.0359***
0.0504***
-0.1033***
-0.1595***
-0.0242**

1
-0.0586***
0.0496***
0.0107
-0.0308***

1
0.0116
0.0689***
-0.1172***

1
-0.0273**
0.0407***

1
0.0304***

1

1.
0.185
0
0
1
0.315
8,008

2.
2,510,000
127,000
1,020,000
13,900,000
3,940,000
8,008

3.
1,980,000
57,784.5
705,000
11,500,000
3,500,000
8,008

4.
54.99
34.00
56.25
71.75
10.64
8,008

5.
54.81
37.50
56.25
71.25
10.72
8,008

6.
-0.07
-3.40
-0.10
3.46
1.83
8,008

7.
-0.08
-3.30
-0.15
3.33
1.78
8,008

8.
0.04
-1.52
0.28
0.74
0.70
8,008

9.
0.08
-1.34
0.41
1.07
0.85
8,008
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Table 9 Population-Averaged Model Results
Estimates
0.2755***
(9.66)
Acquirer GDP
0.0000
(-1.60)
Target GDP
0.0000
(-0.23)
Acquirer Cultural Values
-0.0005
(-1.27)
Target Cultural Values
-0.0011***
(-2.90)
Acquirer Governance
(H1)
-0.0204***
(-3.41)
Target Governance
-0.0281***
(-5.62)
Acquirer OPR
-0.0107***
(-4.55)
Target OPR
-0.0034
(-1.49)
Acquirer Governance * Target Governance
(H2)
-0.0205***
(-2.87)
Acquirer Governance * Acquirer OPR
(H3)
-0.0072**
(-2.21)
Acquirer Governance * Target OPR
(H4)
0.0072**
(2.33)
Observations
8,008
Number of country-pairs
1,744
This table presents population-averaged (generalized estimating equation) panel regression results of the
effects of Acquirer operational risk (OPR), Target OPR, Acquirer Institutional Development, and Target
Institutional Development on the country-pair (Target Nation and Acquirer Nation)’s withdrawn ratio per
year from 1996 to 2016 surrounding cross-border M&As. The t statistics based on robust standard errors
clustered by the country pair are reported in brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
DV: Withdrawal Ratio
Constant
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Table 10 Multilevel Method Results
Estimates
0.2677***
(5.70)
Acquirer GDP
0.0000
(-0.54)
Target GDP
0.0000
(0.77)
Acquirer Cultural Values
-0.0008*
(-1.89)
Target Cultural Values
-0.0013***
(-3.21)
Acquirer Governance
(H1)
-0.0207***
(-2.94)
Target Governance
-0.0291***
(-5.14)
Acquirer OPR
-0.0094***
(-3.17)
Target OPR
-0.0014
(-0.51)
Acquirer Governance * Target Governance
(H2)
-0.0118
(-1.49)
Acquirer Governance * Acquirer OPR
(H3)
-0.0066
(-1.60)
Acquirer Governance * Target OPR
(H4)
0.0075**
(2.03)
Year Fixed Effects (1996-2016)
Yes
Observations
8,008
Number of country-pairs
1,744
This table presents multilevel regression results of the effects of country-level variables such as Acquirer
operational risk (OPR), Target OPR, Acquirer Institutional Development, and Target Institutional
Development on the deal-level dependent variable deal withdrawal from 1996 to 2016 surrounding crossborder M&As. The t statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by the country pair are reported in
brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
DV: Deal Withdrawal
Constant
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Table 11 Population-Averaged Model Results using EFI
Estimates
0.2752***
(8.73)
Acquirer GDP
0.0000
(-1.23)
Target GDP
0.0000
(-0.38)
Acquirer Cultural Values
-0.0005
(-1.26)
Target Cultural Values
-0.0011**
(-2.55)
Acquirer Governance
(H1)
-0.0095
(-1.40)
Target Governance
-0.0117**
(-1.98)
Acquirer OPR
-0.0105***
(-4.19)
Target OPR
-0.0037
(-1.57)
Acquirer Governance * Target Governance
(H2)
-0.0103
(-1.23)
Acquirer Governance * Acquirer OPR
(H3)
-0.0065*
(-1.95)
Acquirer Governance * Target OPR
(H4)
0.0050
(1.49)
Year Fixed Effects (2000-2016)
Yes
Observations
7,852
Number of country-pairs
1,709
This table presents population-averaged model results of the effects of country-level variables such as
Acquirer operational risk (OPR), Target OPR, Acquirer Institutional Development, and Target
Institutional Development on the country-level dependent variable withdrawn ratio from 2000 to 2016
surrounding cross-border M&As. The t statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by the country
pair are reported in brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
DV: Withdrawal Ratio
Constant
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APPENDIX--FIGURES

Figure 1 Interaction Effects of Industry Relatedness and Cultural Distance
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Figure 2 Interaction Effects of Industry Relatedness and Institutional Distance

Figure 3 Interaction Effects of Institutional Distance and Cultural Distance
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Figure 4B Interaction Plot of Acquirer Governance and Target Governance
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Figure 5B Interaction Effect of Acquirer Governance and Acquirer OPR
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Figure 7 Marginal Effect of Acquirer Governance at Target Governance Using MLM
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Figure 8 Marginal Effect of Acquirer Governance at Acquirer OPR Using MLM

- 118 -

-.1

Deal Withdrawal
-.05
0

.05

Marginal Effect of Acquirer Governance w/95% Confidence Bands

-4

-3

-2

-1

0
Target OPR

1

2

3

4

Figure 9 Marginal Effect of Acquirer Governance at Target OPR Using MLM
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Figure 10 Marginal Effect of Acquirer Governance at Target Governance using EFI
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Figure 11 Marginal Effect of Acquirer Governance at Acquirer OPR using EFI
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Figure 12 Marginal Effect of Acquirer Governance at Target OPR using EFI
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